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RICHARD L. HASENt
As now, when here's the fixed Assembly Day,
And morning come, and no one in the Pnyx.
They're in the Agora chattering, up and down
Scurrying to dodge the cord dripping red.
-Aristophanes, The Acharnianst
INTRODUCTION
In ancient Athens, election officials corralled voters with a red-
dyed rope, herding them from the marketplace to the Assembly's
voting area at the nearby Pnyx.2 Athenian officials in later years
simply paid voters to attend the Assembly.' In contemporary Italy,
those who fail to vote face the prospect of having their names
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I ARISTOPHANES, The Acharnians, in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF ARISTOPHANES 13,
15 (Moses Hadas ed. & B.B. Rogers trans., 1962).
2 See E.S. STAvELEY, GREEK AND ROMAN VOTING AND ELECTIONS 80 (1972)
("Authoritarian as the procedure may appear, the purpose of the red-dyed rope used
by the police is expressly said to have been to drive loiterers from the open market
on to the Pnyx. By surrounding the area and contracting the rope, thereby
threatening to stain with the dye all those who allowed themselves to come in contact
with it, they presumably succeeded in inducing people there assembled to make off
in the direction of the Pnyx."); see also MOGENS H. HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN ECCLESIA
124 (1983) (suggesting that the Peloponnesian War created an attendance problem
and noting that Athenian authorities later fined citizens for remaining in the market-
place); DAVID STOCKTON, THE CLASSICAL ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 71-72 (1990)
(suggesting that the purpose of the practice was probably to diminish the noise and
distraction of the marketplace rather than to enforce attendance at the assembly).
' See STAVELEY, supra note 2, at 78-79 (noting that after payment for attendance
was introduced at the beginning of the fourth century, the lower echelons of society
could afford to forego the daily wage and attend). Plato ridiculed the practice, saying
it made the people "idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk and
money." Plato, Gorgias, in 7 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 252,288 (Robert
M. Hutchins ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1952).
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posted by the mayor on the communal notice wall and of being
branded a nonvoter in official papers.4  In (where else but?)
California, a voting stub obtained after casting a ballot has entitled
voters to a free half-dozen "Yum-Yum" doughnuts or a discounted
spinal adjustment by a chiropractor.'
Carrots and sticks have been employed to increase voter turnout
since the birth of democracy, in reaction to what rational choice
theorists have termed "the paradox of voting":6 given the infinitesi-
" See Presidential Decree No. 361, Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei Decreti della
Repubblica Italiana [Race. Uff.] art. 115 (Mar. 30, 1957); see also COST. [Constitution]
art. 48 (Italy), translated in Gilbert H. Flanz, Italy, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz eds., 1987) (stating
that voting is a civic duty of each Italian citizen); Giacomo Sani, Italian Voters: 1976-
1979, in ITALY AT THE POLLS, 1979: A STUDY OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 34,
43 n.25 (Howard R. Penniman ed., 1981); Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy, in
DEMOCRACY & ELECTIONS: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
110-12 (Vernon Bogdanor & David Butler eds., 1983) (describing the complex nature
of Italy's electoral system); Raymond E. Wolfinger et al., Predictors of Electoral Turnout:
An International Comparison, 9 POL'YSTUD. REV. 551,562 (1990) (noting that although
voting is not formally required, the Italian constitution declares voting a duty;
therefore, "Italians who fail to vote may have 'DID NOT VOTE' stamped on their
identification papers").
See Faye Fiore, Gimmicks, Glitches Mark Effort to Get Out the Vote, L.A. TIMES,June
9, 1993, at Al (noting that those who voted could receive free doughnuts); Vote-
Buying? No, But Take 10% Off, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1995, at C22 (noting that among
the goods and services offered by merchants in the city of San Ramon to encourage
voting are "savings on hams and oil changes, free checking at a local bank, restaurant
discounts, even a visit to a chiropractor"); see also Jac C. Heckelman, The Effect of the
Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates, 82 PUB. CHOICE 107, 119 (1995) (describing the
existence of the secret ballot as "a hole in the Democrats' [get-out-the-vote] doughnut
plan"). Such incentives are legal in California elections so long as they are not
offered to induce a voter to vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate or
ballot measure, but they are illegal in elections involving candidates for federal office.
Compare CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18522(a)(2) (West 1995) with 18 U.S.C. § 597 (1994)
(imposing a fine or imprisonment on anyone who "makes or offers to make an
expenditure to any person, either to vote or withhold his vote, or to vote for or
against any candidate," as well as on anyone who "solicits, accepts, or receives any
such expenditure in consideration of his vote or the withholding of his vote") and 42
U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (1994) (imposing a fine or imprisonment on anyone who offers or
accepts payment either for registration to vote or for voting) and United States v.
Garcia, 719 F.2d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the federal prohibition on vote-
buying applies to nonfederal candidates who are on the same election-day ballot as
candidates for federal offices, and thus affords Congress the power to regulate
conduct in state elections).
6 This concept should not be confused with the so-called "voting paradox," or the
idea that "collective decisions may lack coherence or appear arbitrary because they
depend on the order in which alternatives are considered." Saul Levmore,
Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmakin& and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971,
984-85 (1989). The voting paradox is most closely associated with Kenneth Arrow's
work, which showed that "given certain conditions, it is impossible-whether through
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mal chance that one's own vote could affect the outcome of most
elections or the stability of the electoral system, it often appears
rational to abstain from voting. The paradox facing rational choice
scholars is that many people do vote in the absence of visible carrots
or sticks, although not in the same numbers in comparable elections
or across state or national boundaries.
Social norms may solve the paradox of voting in a meaningful
way. A social norm could induce voting through (1) social sanctions
that raise the costs of nonvoting; (2) social rewards that raise the
benefits of voting; and (3) internalization of a norm of voting. The
norm of voting overcomes at least two collective action problems:
First, society is better off if all (or at least many) people vote
because a large turnout legitimates democratic government, which
is itself a public good. Second, a group is better off if all of its
members vote in a bloc for a particular candidate or party because
politicians offer groups rents or other advantages in exchange for
bloc votes.' Despite these benefits, voting has (at least opportunity)
costs and each person's individual vote alone has a negligible effect
on the provision of these public goods. The norm of voting
overcomes the apparent irrationality of voting, thereby facilitating
the provision of these public goods.
This Article examines the plausibility and implications of a
norm-based explanation for voting. Part I reviews rational choice
models for voting, contrasts the rational choice models with the
social norms hypothesis, and examines the empirical evidence
regarding the existence of a norm of voting. As Part I demon-
strates, rational choice explanations have offered only a tautological
explanation of why people vote: People vote when the psychic
benefits of voting exceed its costs.' Unlike the rational choice
explanation, a norm-based explanation of voting can explain
plausibly why some people vote, as well as explain aggregate
changes in voter turnout over time. Although the norms hypothesis
is plausible, evidence supporting the hypothesis is sketchy and may
be consistent with alternative explanations for voting. The analysis
majority or any other method of aggregating individual preferences-to assure that
social outcomes will not be paradoxical." Id. at 987-88 (citing KENNETH ARROw,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951)).
7 See Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public
Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (1996).
s Rational choice theory has much to say about voting on the margin, but very little
to say about why voting occurs in the first place. See infra part I.A.
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in Part I illustrates a general proposition that norm-based explana-
tions are about as easy to conjure up as they are difficult to prove.
Assuming that a norm of voting has served to overcome
collective action problems for only certain groups in the United
States, and assuming that the norm has eroded over time even
among these groups because of a decrease in social connectedness,
arguably the state should take on the role of social sanctioner of last
resort through a compulsory voting law. Part II of this Article,
building upon Ellickson's pathbreaking work, Order Without Law,
9
examines the substitutability of state- and societal-based mechanisms
for social control in the voting context. In particular, this Part
considers whether compulsory voting laws could serve as a good
substitute for a norm of voting.
Part II demonstrates that state- and societal-based methods of
control are not always substitutable. Enactment of a compulsory
voting law in the United States, even if desirable as a method of
overcoming collective action problems, and even if proven effective
as a means of increasing turnout in other states, is unlikely to occur
because of a widely held libertarian belief against government
interference in the decision to vote.
I. USING SOCIAL NORMS TO SOLVE THE PARADOX OF VOTING
A. Like Voting for Chocolate: The Vacuity of the
Rational Choice Voting Model
The paradox of voting has proven to be something of a "roach
motel" for rational choice theorists: entering the debate has proven
much easier than emerging from it unscathed. Indeed, opponents
of rational choice theory have pointed to the paradox as indisput-
able proof of the theory's failure to explain political phenomena
generally.' ° This is not the place to examine whether the paradox
9 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrHouT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTEs (1991).10 
See e.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 70 (1994) (analyzing the inadequacy of rational choice theory in predicting
an equilibrium rate of turnout and concluding that "[r]eaders interested in
determinants of voter turnout ... will derive little insight from the empirical work
in the rational choice tradition"); Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Rational Citizen Faces
Election Day or What Rational Choice Theorists Don't Tell You About American Elections,
in ELECTIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WARREN E. MILLER 71,
71 (M. KentJennings & Thomas E. Mann eds., 1994) ("The inescapable conclusion
is that rational choice theory is inherently unsuited to illuminating voter turnout.").
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is symptomatic of general "pathologies" of rational choice theory;11
rather, I focus here on various rational choice attempts to explain
the paradox of voting.
Although he never used the phrase, Anthony Downs is credited
with first recognizing the paradox in his classic work, An Economic
Theory of Democracy.12 Downs made the following assumptions
necessary to the paradox: (1) there are costs associated with
acquiring information about whom to vote for" and, more impor-
tantly, with voting itself;" (2) each citizen derives benefits from
living in a democracy, and those benefits depend upon a sufficient
number of people voting;' 5 and (3) each voter "will actually get this
reward even if he himself does not vote as long as a sufficient
number of other citizens do."
16
Downs's solution to the paradox rested on what is now widely
recognized as faulty rational choice logic: He argued that the
rational voter "is willing to bear certain short-run costs he could
avoid in order to do his share in providing long-run benefits." 7 As
Even Russell Hardin has noted that rational choice theory "yields a notoriously poor
explanation of voting behavior." RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 11 (1982).
" See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 49. For a number of rational choice
proponents' responses to Green and Shapiro's work, see 9 CRITICAL REV., Winter-
Spring 1995, at 1-223.
12 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260 (1957) ("[E]very
rational man decides whether to vote just as he makes all other decisions: if the
returns outweigh the costs, he votes; if not, he abstains.").
"s See id. at 221-25 (arguing that most information about whom to vote for is
"free" information obtained accidentally); id. at 245 (noting that the rational voter "is
likely to rely purely on the stream of free information he receives in the course of his
nonpolitical pursuits" and that "[h]e will not even utilize all the free information
available, since assimilating it takes time").
" See id. at 265-66 ("[Tlime is the principal cost of voting: time to register, to
discover what parties are running, to deliberate, to go to the polls, and to mark the
ballot.").
15 See id. at 261-62 ("If no one votes, then the system collapses because no
government is chosen. We assume that the citizens of a democracy ... derive
benefits from its continuance; hence, they do not want it to collapse.").
16 Id. at 270.
" Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 269 ("Since the consequences of universal
failure to vote are both obvious and disastrous, and since the cost of voting is small,
at least some men can rationally be motivated to vote even when their personal gains
in the short run are outweighed by their personal costs."). Significantly, Downs
recognized (but failed to pursue) "social prestige" as an alternative explanation for
voting and rejected as "irrational" nonpolitical reasons for voting, like pleasing"one's
employer or one's sweetheart." Id. at 275 n.11, 276 (noting that the reward or guilty
feelings, for voting or not voting, associated with social prestige function on an
unconscious level to achieve the same end that the return for voting per se achieves
consciously in his model); see also id. at 7 (limiting rational behavior to that which is
1996] 2139
2140 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 2135
Brian Barry has explained, Downs's reasoning
requires our citizen to reason that since the benefits he gets
depends on the efforts of others, he should contribute too. This
may be good ethics, but it is not consistent with the assumptions
of the model, which require the citizen to compute the advantage
that accrues to him from his doing x rather than y; not the
advantage that would accrue to him from himself and others doing
x rather than y, unless, of course, his doing it is a necessary and
sufficient condition of the others doing it."
On this reasoning, even a pure altruist in the conventional rational
choice model would conclude that it is irrational to vote.
19
Riker and Ordeshook addressed the paradox using a model
consistent with rational choice theory, but virtually devoid of
explanatory power. In their model, a citizen chooses to vote rather
than abstain whenever:
pB - C + D > 0,20
politically motivated and excluding behavior such as a man deciding to vote for a
particular candidate to "prevent his wife's tantrums"). No doubt this last statement
will remind the reader that Downs wrote his book in 1957.
18 BRIAN BARRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS AND DEMOCRACY 20 (Univ. Chicago
Press 1978) (1970) ("If the system is going to collapse because too few people vote,
[the rational voter's] one additional ballot-paper is unlikely to prevent it."); see also
Thomas Schwartz, Your Vote Counts on Account of the Way It Is Counted: An Institutional
Solution to the Paradox of Not Voting, 54 PUB. CHOICE 101, 110 (1987) ("[If preserving
democracy or electing a particular candidate] are the only political goals of voting
then individual citizens have no incentive to vote apart from a sense of obligation to
cooperate in the pursuit of common goals.").
19 See HOwARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY
OF SOCIAL CHOICE 85 (Univ. Chicago Press 1984) (1982) (noting that the rational
voter model does not assume narrow self-interest: "[ylou are free to be as public-
spirited as you wish").
21 William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62
AM. POL. SCi. REv. 25,28 (1968). Ferejohn and Fiorina have presented an alternative
"minimax regret" model, whereby a rational decisionmaker "imagines himself in each
possible future state of the world and looks at how much in error each of his available
actions could be, given that state. Then he chooses that action whose maximum error
over the states of nature is least." John A. Ferejohn & Morris P. Fiorina, The Paradox
of Not Voting. A Decision Theoretic Analysis, 68 AM. POL. SC:. REV. 525, 535 (1974).
In the context of voting, the authors argue that a minimax regret decisionmaker
might explain why he voted by stating: "My God, what if I didn't vote and my
preferred candidate lost by one vote? I'd feel like killing myself." Id. For early
criticisms of this model, see the articles collected at 69 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 908-28
(1975). As an example of the most trenchant criticism, imagine the minimax regret
decisionmaker who might explain why he did not vote by stating- "My God, what if
I went out to vote and I was run over by a steamroller? If I weren't dead, I'd feel like
killing myself." On the suggestion that a steamroller could run over the minimax
regret decisionmaker, see Schwartz, supra note 18, at 111.
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where B is "the differential benefit, in utiles, that an individual voter
receives from the success of his more preferred candidate over his
less preferred one,"2" p is the probability that a citizen will bring
about B by voting, where 0 S p 1,22 C is "the cost to the indivi-
dual of the act of voting,"2 3 and D is the utility of other psychic
benefits of voting, including "the satisfaction from compliance with
the ethic of voting."
24
Recognizing that in most elections p is close to zero,25 the
equation reduces to the expression that people vote when
D> C,
or when the psychic benefits of voting exceed the costs. 26  As
evidence supporting their hypothesis, Riker and Ordeshook pointed
to the high correlation between voting and a sense of "citizen duty,"
as measured by Election Day polling conducted by the Survey
' Riker & Ordeshook, supra note 20, at 25.22Id.
2Id.
24 Id. at 28. Other psychic benefits include: "the satisfaction from affirming
allegiance to the political system; the satisfaction from affirming a partisan
preference; the satisfaction of deciding, going to the polls;" and "the satisfaction of
affirming one's efficacy in the political system." Id.
"Meehl notes that Riker and Ordeshook estimate the value forp in an American
presidential election
as p = 10", and my rough calculations indicate my chances of determining
who becomes President are of about [the] same order of magnitude as my
chances of being killed driving to the polls-hardly a profitable venture.
Precise estimates are neither possible nor necessary, since any fairly
computed value surely lies below thep < .0001 whose complement q = .9999
Bernoulli and Buffon, and all reasonable men, regularly treat as a "moral
certainty."
Paul E. Meehl, The Selfysh Voter Paradox and the Thrown.Away Vote Argument, 71 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 11, 11 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
There is little empirical support for the claim that turnout increases with an
increase in p. See John G. Matsusaka, Election Closeness and Voter Turnout: Evidence
from California Ballot Propositions, 76 PUB. CHOICE 313, 328-32 (1993) (finding no
systematic relation between closeness and turnout in 885 California ballot proposi-
tions between 1912 and 1990). Riker and Ordeshook nonetheless claim that voters'
subjective valuation of p positively correlates with turnout. As Green and Shapiro
point out, however, this conclusion is subject to serious question because Riker and
Ordeshook had no data on voters' subjective probabilities of casting the decisive vote.
See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 54. Instead, Riker and Ordeshook used a
survey question regarding how close the voter believed the outcome of the
presidential election might be, hardly a good proxy for p. See Riker & Ordeshook,
supra note 20, at 35. For a discussion of Riker and Ordeshook's argument that voter
misperception of p explains turnout, see infra part I.C.
26 See Riker & Ordeshook, supra note 20, at 35.
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Research Center at the University of Michigan.
27
Gordon Tullock and others have concluded from the body of
work following Riker and Ordeshook that rational choice theory has
very little to say about why people vote. Tullock has characterized
voting as an act of consumption, driven by a taste for voting
exogenous to the economic model, much like the taste for choco-
late.28 Although a consumption explanation can tell us about
voting on the margin (for example, the amount of voting goes
down, like the demand for chocolate, when its price relative to
other goods goes up),2 it tells us nothing about who has this taste,
' See id. at 37-38. This data set, now known as the National Election Study (NES)
data, constitutes the most important survey research conducted regarding national
elections. The data are available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research.
Wolfinger argues that
the NES's citizen duty scale is remarkably ill-suited to its place in Riker and
Ordeshook's model. For one thing, none of the four items concerns
expressive gratification. Moreover, one statement dismisses many local
elections as "not important enough to bother with," which seems beside the
point when studying voting in a presidential election.
Wolfinger, supra note 10, at 73; see also GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 67 n.26
(explaining that the phraseology of citizen duty questions in the NES survey may bias
the results against those with less education).
" See, e.g., Rebecca B. Morton, Groups in Rational Turnout Models, 35 AM.J. POL.
Sci. 758, 759 n.2 (1991) (citing personal communications from Gordon Tullock).
Wolfinger, apparently unaware of the chocolate metaphor, has suggested that "[i]t
must be a bittersweet experience to salvage formal choice theories of turnout with
such squishy variables." Wolfinger, supra note 10, at 74.
Grofman takes a view similar to Tullock: "[It is appropriate to think about
rational choice models in the context of accounting for changes in choices, rather
than choices, per se." Bernard Grofman, Is Turnout the Paradox That Ate Rational
Choice Theory?, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION, AND CHOICE 93, 94 (Bernard
Grofman ed., 1993); see also Donald Wittman, Comment, 18J.L. & EcON. 735,736-37
(1975) ("We rarely ask in economics whether somebody who likes French cooking,
went to college and who prefers green to yellow vegetables is more likely to buy a
market basket with three pounds of steak, one pound of onions, ajar of French's
mustard, etc., than a market basket with two pounds of chicken, one pound of liver,
green beans, etc. Yet th[ese are] precisely the kinds of questions asked in voting
studies."). Hinich, relying on the taste for voting assumption, models voting as a
consumption activity characterized by people gaining utility by voting for the winner
of an election and disutility by voting for the loser. See Melvin J. Hinich, Voting As
an Act of Contribution, 36 PUB. CHOICE 135, 136 (1981). But, as Morton observes,
"[t]his rationale would predict that the highest turnout levels occur when there is a
landslide, which most empirical evidence disavows." Morton, supra, at 760 n.3.
" See Randall G. Chapman & Kristian S. Palda, Electoral Turnout in Rational Voting
and Consumption Perspectives, 9J. CONSUMER RES. 337, 339 (1983) ("[An individual's]
relative consumption of voting rises, not because tastes shift in favor of electoral
participation, but because the participation's shadow price falls as skill and experience
in the appreciation of politics and political activities are acquired with exposure.").
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where it is acquired, or whether the taste for voting changes over
time."0 As Barry has remarked, Riker and Ordeshook's analysis
"does not leave any scope for an economic model to come between
the premises and the phenomenon to be explained. Instead, the
question shifts back to: 'Why do some people have this kind of
motivation more than others?"'31
Rational choice theorists have had greater success explaining
voting on the margin, given a taste for voting distributed somehow
in the population. This work has focused primarily upon how
changes in costs, such as elimination of the poll tax or increased
availability of political information, affect turnout.
3 2
A few brave theorists have ventured to explain why people vote
without relying on a "taste for voting" argument. These efforts have
largely failed, however. One line of research has examined
circumstances under which p could be high enough to make pB > C.
Palfrey and Rosenthal noted that the value of p depends upon
strategic interaction among all voters-after all, if a voter knew
everyone else was planning to abstain, p = I for that voter and her
vote is decisive."3 The authors concluded that in a society in which
every voter had complete information about the preferences and
so For a classic argument that tastes "neither change capriciously nor differ
importantly between people," see GeorgeJ. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non
Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECoN. REv. 76, 76 (1977).
31 BARRY, supra note 18, at 16. As Wittman similarly observed: "Just as we would
expect that people who feel it is important to eat lettuce every day are more likely to
eat lettuce than those who do not, we expect that those who feel more obligated to
vote, vote more often than those who do not." Wittman, supra note 28, at 740. Sen
observed that if people vote out of a sense of delight rather than in an attempt to
affect the outcome of an election, individual votes may not follow true preferences.
See AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 195-96 (1970); see
also GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN LOMAsKY, DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE
THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE 32-37,117-20 (1993) (contrasting expressive and
instrumental voting).
.2 See, e.g., John E. Filer et al., Voting Laws, Educational Policies, and Minority
Turnout, 34J.L. & ECON. 371,375-89 (1991) (discussing how the Voting Rights Act,
voter literacy tests, and poll taxes affected African-American turnout between 1948
and 1980); Stephen Knack, The Voter Participation Effects of Selecting Jurors from
Registration Lists, 36J.L. & ECON. 99, 103-09 (1993) (analyzing the disincentive effect
on voting of choosing jurors from voter registration rolls); John G. Matsusaka,
Explaining Voter Turnout Patterns: An Information Theoy, 84 PUB. CHOICE 91, 95-105
(1995) (using information costs to explain change in turnout); see also Peverill Squire
ct al., Residential Mobility and Voter Turnout, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 45, 51-57 (1987)
(finding nonvoting correlated with residential mobility).
"sSee Thomas R. Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, A Strategic Calculus of Voting, 41
PUB. CHOICE 7, 10 (1983) (noting that "if everyone else votes, p can readily be very
small," but "if no one else votes, the probability of being decisive would be 1").
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voting costs of every other voter, p could be very close to 1 in
equilibrium.' They later conceded, however, that the full informa-
tion assumption is unrealistic for large electorates, and that without
that assumption, the only citizens who vote are those "whose sense
of duty outweighs any cost in voting. We have come full circle and
are once again beset by the paradox of not voting. " "
Schwartz also has presented a model with a nontrivial value for
p, positing that although one person's vote has no chance of
determining an election winner, "it has, at least by comparison, a
non-negligible chance of determining which candidate carries her
precinct, and that might well determine whether and at what levels
her precinct receives distributive benefits.""6  Unfortunately,
Schwartz failed to provide any evidence demonstrating thatp is truly
non-negligible in what he terms the voter's "sub-electorate," or that
voters go to the polls because they believe their vote affects the
provision of distributive benefits in their precinct.
Another line of research has looked for tangible economic
benefits from voting, thereby injecting narrow self-interest into the
D term.37 Schwartz, arguing from the unproven premise that
" See Thomas R. Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, Voter Participation and Strategic
Uncertainty, 79 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 62, 64 (1985) ("In equilibrium, the presumably
smallp... could in fact be I or very close to 1, independent of electorate size."); see
also George Tsebelis, A General Model of Tactical and Inverse Tactical Voting, 15 Barr.
J. POL. ScI. 395, 398 (1986) (suggesting that a person chooses to vote whenever "he
cannot exclude the possibility that his vote might influence the result" of an election).
" Palfrey & Rosenthal, supra note 34, at 64. Hardin made the same point earlier:
"[I]n general for large n, looking at the matrix to decide whether it is a Prisoner's
Dilemma may be less compelling than determining the expected value to me of my
contribution." HARDIN, supra note 10, at 59-60; see also JAMES S. COLEMAN,
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 290 n.8 (1990) (characterizing voting as "a game
against nature, a non-strategic other").
3 Schwartz, supra note 18, at 105. Wolfinger similarly argues that "as the relevant
political unit becomes smaller, the likelihood of being decisive increases." Wolfinger,
supra note 10, at 77.
'7 Similarly, many rational choice theorists have posited that C, the costs ofvoting,
are negligible. See e.g., HARDIN, supra note 10, at 61 (referring to the act of voting
as "public and uncostly");John H. Aldrich, Rational Choice and Turnout, 37 AM.J. POL.
Sci. 246, 261 (1993) (noting that "for many people most of the time ... [voting is]
a low-cost, low-benefit action"); Richard G. Niemi, Costs of Voting and Nonvoting, 27
PUB. CHOICE 115, 115 (1976) (observing that "voting has a very low cost"); Schwartz,
supra note 18, at 107-08 (analogizing the cost of voting to the costs associated with
buying a candy bar or strolling); Gordon Tullock, The Paradox of Not Votingfor Oneself,
69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 919, 919 (1975) ("Clearly the cost of voting is very slight.").
Even if this debatable point were universally true, it does not explain why some
people bear these low costs and others spend their time voting when they could be
eating a candy bar or strolling. See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 53-54 (noting
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"often it is obvious to others" how one voted, posits that voting can
earn the voter "access, influence and credit toward political
favors.""' Although Schwartz's proposition does not appear to be
true generally,39 there is evidence that narrow self-interest moti-
vates at least some voters. Wolfinger and Rosenstone found that
government employees in patronage states tend to have a higher
turnout as a group than government employees in states using a
merit system for government employment,40 presumably because
politicians can monitor patronage employees' trips to the voting
booths and dole out punitive sanctions for nonvoting. Schwartz's
thesis has nothing to say, however, about why government employ-
ees in nonpatronage states and federal government employees
(whose voting behavior is not monitored by politicians) tend to have
a higher voter turnout than private employees possessing similar
education and income levels.
41
In a more plausible line of analysis, Uhlaner has argued that
group leaders obtain tangible benefits from politicians in exchange
for promises to deliver votes from group members. Group leaders
then use some of the benefits supplied by politicians to provide
selective incentives to group members to vote. As Uhlaner argues:
Sometimes the benefits are economic selective incentives (e.g.,
dollar bills in envelopes handed to known supporters at the polls
or repair of the sidewalk in front of the homes of those who
voted). Some of the surplus may be used to decrease the costs of
voting (e.g., by providing information or transportation to the
polls). Many times the surplus may go in to increasing the
that given the small probability of casting a decisive vote, even voting at a very low
cost often will not be rational).
s Schwartz, supra note 18, at 104-05.
s Schwartz's argument may have been true historically, however. The introduc-
tion of the secret ballot in various states at the beginning of the century apparently
accounted for an average drop in turnout of 6.9%. See Heckelman, supra note 5, at
119. Heckelman attributes the drop to the elimination of the possibility of effective
bribery. See id.
4 0 
See RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES 94-101
(1980); see also Wolfinger, supra note 10, at 77 (suggesting that "the parents, spouses,
significant others, siblings and adult children of the candidates" are likely to vote,
presumably for similar reasons).
41 See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 40, at 97-101;seealso Stephen Knack,
Civic Norms, Social Sanctions, and Voter Turnout, 4 RATIONALITY & Soc'y 133, 135
(1992) ("Material rewards such as cash or patronage account for only a tiny portion
of turnout in contemporary American national elections... ."); Matsusaka, supra note
32, at 101 (attributing high turnout rates of public employees to their access to low
cost information about candidates and parties).
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normative benefits of voting, such as enhancing a sense of
fulfilling a group-specific duty to participate.
4 2
Unfortunately, so far no one has produced compelling evidence
supporting Uhlaner's thesis.4 None of the people I know person-
ally (an undoubtedly unscientific sample) admit to receiving tangible
economic benefits from any group leaders in exchange for their
vote. Given the recent furor over allegations that African-American
ministers in New Jersey received money to suppress voter turnout
in a recent governor's race,44 I suspect we would see more than
occasional public reports that voters received tangible selective
incentives for their votes if the practice was widespread enough to
account for much voting.
In sum, the standard rational choice model of why people vote
has not moved beyond positing a taste for voting distributed
randomly in the population. Although creative rational choice
theorists have set forth novel explanations for voting without relying
on the taste argument, these theorists have provided no evidence
thus far sustaining their claim. Rational choice theory seems best
suited to explaining voting on the margin only, by examining how
changes in costs (the C term) affect turnout.
' Carole J. Uhlaner, What the Downsian Voter Weighs: A Reassessment of the Costs
and Benefits of Action, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION, AND CHOICE 67, 74 (Bernard
Grofman ed., 1993) [hereinafter Uhlaner, Downsian Voter]. For a more extended
analysis, see CaroleJ. Uhlaner, Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups, 33 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 390, 396-413 (1989) (developing the group model empirically); CaroleJ.
Uhlaner, Political Participation, Rational Actors, and Rationality: A New Approach, 7
POL. PSYCHOL. 551, 559-66 (1986) (presenting an alternative rational actor theory of
participation that focuses on leaders and groups in addition to voters and candidates).
" I focus here on Uhlaner's claim that tangible selective incentives provided by
group leaders account for voting. For a discussion of her claim regarding nontangi-
ble benefits, see infra note 77. Green and Shapiro reanalyzed the empirical evidence
Uhlaner provided for her thesis (an increase in turnout by union members during the
midterm congressional elections following Reagan's 1980 election) and contend that
her interpretation is unsupported by any statistical evidence. See GREEN & SHAPIRO,
supra note 10, at 53 n.7. In addition, Morton notes that if group leaders were
motivated solely by receiving "perks" from candidates, policy would play no role in
whom group leaders choose to support. "This type of approach would appear to
contradict all empirical evidence that groups do vote in response to policy differences
of candidates." Morton, supra note 28, at 770 n.8.
" For a fascinating analysis of the issues involved, see Pamela S. Karlan, Not By
Money But By Virtue Won? Vote Trafficking and the Voting Rights System, 80 VA. L. REV.
1455 (1994).
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B. The Origin, Stability, and Possible Decline
of a Norm of Voting
If proven, a norm solves the paradox of voting in a meaningful
way; that is, by doing more than merely positing a taste for voting
distributed randomly in the population. This subpart sets forth a
theoretical account of the origin, stability, and possible decline of
a voting norm. Part I.C then examines whether the empirical
evidence supports the norms hypothesis.
1. The Origin, Stability, and Possible Decline of Norms
A social norm is a behavioral pattern characterized by three
practices: (1) nearly everyone in a group conforms to it; (2) nearly
everyone in the group approves of this conformity and disapproves
of deviation from it; and (3) the approval and disapproval helps to
ensure that nearly everyone in the group conforms.45 Although
sanctions and rewards induce some norm-based behavior, a central
component of social norms is internalization, whereby "an individual
comes to have an internal sanctioning system which provides
punishment when he carries out an action proscribed by the norm
or fails to carry out an action prescribed by the norm."46 Thus,
many group members follow the norm even when others cannot
observe their behavior.
Early work on theories of social norms had a decidedly function-
alist orientation, "explaining the emergence of a norm by the
functions it serves for the set of actors who hold it."47 Functional-
ist explanations of norms violate the principle of methodological
individualism, constituting "an unacceptable deus ex machina-a
concept brought in at the macrosocial level to explain social
behavior, yet itself left unexplained. 48 In functionalist accounts,
norms present a typical free-rider paradox: "Everyone is better off
* In this definition, I roughly follow Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational
Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHICS 725, 751 (1990); see also Jon Elster, Norms of Revenge,
100 ETHICS 862, 864 (1990) ("For norms to be social, they must be shared by other
people and sustained by their approval and disapproval."). Seegenerally Symposium,
Norms in Moral and Social Theory, 100 ETHICS 725 (1990).
4 COLEMAN, supra note 35, at 293.47 Id. at 259. The work of sociologist Talcott Parsons, which asserts the primacy
of values, is most closely associated with such explanations. See id. at 241. For a
critique of Parson's "sociological approach," see BARRY, supra note 18, at 75-98.
48 COLEMAN, supra note 35, at 242; see also id. at 259 ("The fact that a set of actors
is interested in gaining the right to control the actions of individual actors is not
sufficient as an explanation for their coming to gain that right.").
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if everyone enforces a norm, but because enforcement is costly each
is motivated not to bother enforcing it himself."49
Fortunately, scholars committed to methodological individual-
ism-most notably Ullmann-Margalit," Sugden,5" Elster,5 2 and
Colemans--have moved the theory of norms beyond its functional-
ist orientation. Coleman has set forth two requirements for the
emergence of a social norm. First, a demand for the norm must
arise, such as in the presence of a collective action problem.
54
Second, those who would benefit from the norm, acting rationally,
can share appropriately either the costs of sanctioning or the costs
of inducing others to sanction.5 5 The second condition, which
Coleman terms the "second order free-rider problem," is met when
there are sufficient social relationships among the beneficiaries of
the norm. 6
Coleman uses the example of team sports, whereby a norm
emerges for a team member to work harder than rational choice
theory would predict, given the free-rider problem. The encourage-
ment of others, that is, positive sanctions, motivates the team
member to act with "zeal;"5 "[t]he shouts of encouragement to an
athlete from his teammates may cost them little but provide him
with rewards that lead him to work even harder." 8 The team
member rationally increases the effort because the payoff for acting
with zeal is greater than the payoff for free-riding.
Although Coleman explains the rationality of the teammate's
zeal in a straightforward manner, he is less than clear in explaining
why other team members provide positive sanctions to the zealous
teammate. Why does each individual member not free-ride rather
than shout encouragement?5 9
49 Pettit, supra note 45, at 739; see also Elster, supra note 45, at 873 ("Empirically,
it is not true that people frown upon others when they fail to sanction people who
fail to sanction people who fail to sanction a norm violation.").
5o See EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALiT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977).
51 
See ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE
(1986).
52 SeeJON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY (1990).
-s See COLEMAN, supra note 35.
s4 See id. at 241.
See id. at 273.
See id.
57 Id. at 274.
m Id. at 277.
59 Cf id. at 274 ("If a number of persons' interests are satisfied by the same
outcome, then each has an incentive to reward the others for working toward that
outcome.").
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Social relationships are the key to sanctioning.' Positive (and
sometimes negative) sanctioning often is either costless or provides
a benefit to the sanctioners. Using an important example, Braith-
waite explains that people enjoy gossip, an activity that presupposes
existing social relationships." Talking about others' activities-pos-
itively or negatively-is a consumption activity. People playing team
sports similarly enjoy shouting encouragement to the zealous team
member; the activity increases, not decreases, utility.
Moreover, people in social relationships care about others'
opinions of them-what McAdams has called "esteem"6 2-and Pettit
has explained how people valuing esteem may be rewarded or
punished, even if others expend no costs on sanctioning:
[It is commonly assumed] that the enforcement of norms must
involve intentional action and since action always generates at least
time costs that it must therefore be potentially costly for those
who conduct it. The surprising thing however is that this is
false.... [P]eople do not have to identify violators intentionally;
they just have to be around in sufficient numbers to make it likely
that violators will be noticed. And equally, people do not have to
discipline violators intentionally, going out of their way for
example to rebuke them or report them to others; they just have
to disapprove of them-or at least be assumed to disapprove of
them-whether that attitude ever issues in intentional activity.
We care not just about the rebukes and commendations we
receive from others but also about whether they take a negative or
positive view of what we do .... How can we know about other
people's dispositions if they are not exercised? Easy. We know
what they know of us and, ascribing similar standards to them, we
know whether they are likely to think well or badly, to take a
favorable or unfavorable attitude.
63
To clarify and summarize the argument thus far, for a social
norm to arise, group members must demand a norm, as they might
in the presence of a collective action problem. The norm will
6' See id. at 270, 276.
61 See Pettit, supra note 45, at 739 n.37 ("[R]eporting violators to others is
generally something people enjoy." (citing JOHN BRArTHwAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND
REINTEGRATION (1989))); see also Robert D. Cooter, StructuralAdjudication and the New
Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 224-25
(1994) ("Social norms evolve through a process of discussion . . ").
62 See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1003, 1019-21 (1995).
"s Pettit, supra note 45, at 739-40.
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emerge, however, only when it is rational for group members to
provide positive or negative sanctions. In the presence of social
relationships, sanctioning may be a beneficial (or at least a costless)
activity. The greater the intensity of social relationships (or "social
connectedness"), the greater the opportunity for positive and
negative sanctioning. Social connectedness means that there will be
(1) unintentional observation of group members' behavior; (2)
opportunities for gossip; and (3) concern about esteem.
Once the norm emerges, it has a certain "stickiness." Group
members internalize the norm, and social sanctions reinforce that
internalization. Norms have what Jon Elster terms "a grip on the
mind."" Individuals follow the norm and sanction others without
going through an outcome-oriented rational calculus.65  The
"stickiness" ensures that norms will remain stable over time even if
demand for the norm ceases. An often-used example of this
phenomenon is the norm of dueling. Some claim that the norm
arose as a product of the aristocracy's effort to raise their relative
social status. But it is impossible to understand the rationality of a
particular aristocrat participating in a duel-even if the chances of
death by dueling were only one in fourteen-without resort to a
theory that social sanctioning or internalization have changed what
look like impressive payoffs for deviating from the norm.
66
Norms may decline under a few conditions. First, norms decline
as social connectedness diminishes. Sanctioning occurs in social
settings, and sanctioning therefore depends on people being around
each other some of the time; we care less about opinions of others
we never see. 67 In the absence of an opportunity for others to
observe behavior and sanction it, internalization of a norm
64 Elster, supra note 45, at 864.
Elster contrasts the outcome-oriented calculus of rational action with non-
outcome behavior stemming from social norms: "Rationality says: If you want Y, do
X .... The simplest social norms are of the type: Do X (wear black for funerals), or:
Don't do X (don't eat human flesh)." Id. at 863. For this reason, I disagree withJim
Lindgren's argument that Coleman's account of norms is a rational choice
explanation; it is not a rational choice explanation to the extent that individuals who
are internalizing a norm fail to undergo an outcome-oriented calculus. Their
behavior is rational only after the change in tastes has occurred, and the explanation
for why tastes change is exogenous to the rational choice model.
66 See RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOcIC OF GROUP CONFLICT 91-100
(1995) (analyzing the economics of the duel).
67 But we still care about what they think. See SUGDEN, supra note 51, at 151
(noting that some people tip a taxi driver in a city in which they never expect to
return; others do not, but "keep their hands in their pockets... with sensations of
unease and guilt").
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eventually deteriorates.
Moreover, as time progresses payoffs for violating the norm may
change. For example, a norm may solve a particular collective
action problem at a time when the individual benefit of free-riding
over contributing to the collective good is x. People follow the
norm and incur x without making an outcome-oriented decision to
do so. If the benefit of free-riding later increases to x + y, however,
individuals may start considering outcomes once again and
determine whether the benefits of free-riding (with the accompany-
ing social sanctions) exceed the benefits of complying with the
norm." Moreover, some members' norm violations may have a
snowball effect-once enough people decide to violate the norm and
incur punishment, others may be emboldened to violate the
norm.69 As free-riders increase in number, the number of sanc-
tioners decreases, thereby decreasing the odds of being punished
for a norm violation or rewarded for following the norm.
2. Application to a Norm of Voting
Having set forth an explanation for the origin, stability, and
possible decline of social norms generally, I turn now to the norm
of voting. If the norm exists, it leads to (1) social sanctions that
raise the costs of not voting; (2) social rewards that raise the
benefits of voting; and (3) internalization of a norm of voting that
provides self-sanctioning analogous to (1) and (2). As Coleman
describes it:
The end result is that control over the voting of each, which was
initially held by each alone, becomes widely distributed over the
whole set of actors, who exercise that control in the direction of
approval for voting and disapproval for not voting-despite the fact
that each has some reluctance to vote himself.70
' See Timur Kuran, Private and Public Preferences, 6 ECON. & PHIL. 1, 8 (1990)
("Experimental social psychology ... suggests that social pressures, although very
powerful, are not decisive.").
" See Knack, supra note 41, at 146; see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2032-33, 2035 (1996) (discussing norm
cascades).
70 COLEMAN, supra note 35, at 292; see also STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN M.
HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 29 (1993)
("Citizens who comply and participate [in political action] reap the rewards of social
life. They enjoy the attentions and esteem of their friends and associates; they enjoy
the intrinsic satisfactions of having helped their colleagues' cause. Citizens who fail
to comply and refuse to participate receive no rewards; in fact, they may suffer social
sanctions.").
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Using rational choice terminology, a norm of voting changes the
voter's calculus by raising the costs of not voting (the functional
equivalent of lowering the relative cost of C) and by creating the
taste for voting (increasing D). The existence of a voting norm tells
us more than rational choice theory's taste for voting accounts,
however. As explained below, it leads to predictions as to which
groups of people should have that taste, how stable the amount of
voting should be, and the likelihood of a decline in a taste for voting.
Consider first the origin of a voting norm. Recall the two
conditions for a norm to arise: (1) demand for a norm arises
among members of the group, and (2) those who would benefit
from the norm, acting rationally, can share appropriately the costs
of sanctioning or the costs of inducing others to sanction.
71
Members of a group might demand a voting norm because it
leads to provision of two public goods. First, widespread voting
legitimates democratic government, itself a public good. When
enough people vote, elected officials appear to have the consent of
the governed, one of the cornerstones of democratic theory.7 2
Second, when enough members of a particular group vote,
politicians agree to supply benefits to the group in exchange for its
votes.
73
Note that both theories for generating demand presuppose
familiarity with political theory: Potential voters must appreciate
the relationship between voting in the aggregate and the stability
and power relationships of the political system. This observation
suggests that demand for a norm of voting will not be distributed
equally among all groups in the population; rather, the norm is
71 See supra part I.B.1.
SeeJack Dennis, Support for the Institution of Elections By the Mass Public, 64 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 819, 823 (1970) (positing existence of such a norm). For a good
summary of the normative arguments that widespread voting is essential to the
survival of democratic government, see Stephen E. Bennett & David Resnick, The
Implications of Nonvotingfor Democracy in the United States, 34 AM.J. POL. Sci. 771,773-
76 (1990).
' Coleman's analysis mistakenly focuses only on this second collective good. See
COLEMAN, supra note 35, at 291-92, 825-28; cf. Knack, supra note 41, at 136 ("Voting
participation is not only a partisan or group public good but is widely perceived as
a societal or national public good ... ."). Wealthy and powerful groups in society
certainly have an interest in electing officials who will further their immediate policy
goals. But these groups have an even greater interest in the maintenance of
democratic order, which provides the underlying rules of the game allowing for
further accumulation of power and wealth. In other words, it is of greater collective
interest to prevent the Maoist revolution than to elect a president who will eliminate
the capital gains tax.
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more likely to emerge among educated groups and among groups
that already reap positive benefits from the system. Those least
educated and most discriminated against in society are therefore
also least likely to demand a norm.
Even more fundamentally, formidable legal and illegal barriers
to voting prevent emergence of a norm of voting. The story of
African-American disenfranchisement is well known."' Perhaps
less well known are efforts in this century to erect institutional
barriers to prevent the poor from voting."m Without a realistic
chance to exchange group votes for rents from politicians, and with
a lesser stake in the legitimacy of the government, members of these
groups had little reason to demand a norm of voting. Instead, they
focused on securing the right to vote in the first place, which itself
presented collective action problems.
7 6
Demand for a voting norm is a necessary but insufficient
condition for the norm's emergence. The second condition is
sanctioning by group members. Sanctioning requires observability
of the decision to vote and no cost (or perhaps some benefit) to
sanctioning of others' voting behavior.7 At a minimum, it re-
quires some degree of social connectedness among group members.
The wide emergence of a norm of voting in the United States
among enfranchised Americans over the last century may be
explained by reference to the two factors necessary for norm
creation." The last century was characterized by social connected-
ness; people knew their neighbors. Even assuming how one voted
was secret, 9 whether one voted was public knowledge in the
71 For a summary, see J. Morgan Kousser, Suffrage, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 1236, 1240-49, 1251-54 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1984.).
s For a detailed examination, see FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD,
WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE (1988).
71 See generally DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (1991).
" Following Uhlaner, group leaders who recognize that they receive tangible
benefits from politicians may attempt to create demand for a norm among group
members by educating members about the benefits of a well-functioning democratic
system and then using social sanctions to encourage voting. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
78 In the last century voter turnout averaged 77.7%, roughly 23% higher than
current turnout. See RuY A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 8 (1992).
7' But cf. Heckelman, supra note 5, at 110-11 (noting that more than 30 states did
not enact secret-ballot voting laws until the last quarter of the nineteenth century).
Secrecy further undercuts Coleman's argument that demand for a voting norm may
be explained solely by a group's desire to support a particular candidate or party.
The secret ballot prevents effective monitoring of voting behavior; the group may
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community. s On their way to vote, people in the community
unintentionally gathered information about who else went to vote.
Those community members working at polling stations observed all
voters."1 Gossiping about who voted served as a consumption
activity that made sanctioning individually rational. With social
connectedness usually assured, the norm arose among those groups
demanding a norm of voting.
8 2
Once a voting norm arises, the theory predicts it should remain
stable unless social connectedness decreases or the payoff for free-
riding increases to such an extent that obeying the norm becomes
an outcome-oriented calculation.' Arguably, both conditions have
occurred in recent decades.
First, as Knack has argued, we are living in a period of decreas-
ing social connectedness.84  Current society is dominated by
insure only that the group member makes it to the polling place, not that she votes
for a particular candidate or party.
"' It was (and still is) part of the public record, although checking the voting rolls
would require a deliberate, significant effort. It is hard to imagine deliberate
investment in such information as a source for emergence of a norm of voting.
" The absentee ballot is a recent phenomenon. See TEIXEIRA, supra note 78, at
145 n.85. In Puerto Rico, a former section of the voting laws required all voters
assigned to a particular polling place to show up at the polls before voting could
commence for any voter. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 16, § 211, repealed by Act of Feb. 13,
1974, No. 1, pt. 1, art. 10-016, available in LEXIS, Codes library, Prcodes file.
" See Michael Schudson, Voting Rites: Why We Need a New Concept of Citizenship,
AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1994, at 59,59-60, 62 (describing the atmosphere of voting during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
' Even then, we should expect to see some "stickiness"; if many have internalized
the norm (that is, developed a taste for voting), there should not be a precipitous
decline in voting.
" See Knack, supra note 41, at 146-48; see also TEIXEIRA, supra note 78, at 36-42.
But see CLAUDE S. FISCHER, To DWELL AMONG FRIENDS 54-62 (1982) (arguing that
urbanism does not decrease social involvement); id. at 60-61 (arguing that although
urbanites are less likely to encounter someone they know, this fact does not mean
that urbanites have less intimate social relationships).
Robert Putnam has similarly argued that the decline of social connectedness in
America-what he labels "social capital"-is responsible for a host of social ills and that
the main culprit for the decline is the advent of television. See, e.g., Robert D.
Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America,
28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 664, 677 (1995); Robert D. Putnam, Why We're On Our Worst
Behavior, CH. TRIB.,Jan. 10, 1996, at 17. Putnam's thesis, as well as his symbol of
socially disconnected Americans now "bowling alone," has spawned numerous
commentaries and gained Putnam two trips to the White House. See, e.g., Fred
Buning, Bowling Alone Isn't the Answer, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 19, 1996, at B4.
Putnam's thesis may be overdrawn, and his bowling metaphor seems plainly incorrect.
See Peter Y. Hong, Bowling Alley Tour Refutes Theoy of Social Decline, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
18, 1996, at Al (examining Putnam's "catchy metaphor" of people bowling alone, and
finding that "rather than a dearth of community," current attendance at bowling
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anonymity-many people do not know even three of their neighbors.
Individuals go to the voting booth and recognize not a single person
there. Indeed, Knack contends that this lack of social connected-
ness helps to explain the steady decline in turnout for presidential
elections since 1960, despite rational choice predictions that turnout
should have increased because of a reduction of costs, such as
elimination of the poll tax and relative easing of voter registration
provisions.8 5
Second, payoffs for not voting have increased. We have become
the society of the "overworked American"; for example, comparing
1969 with 1987, "the average employed person is now on the job an
additional 163 hours, or the equivalent of an extra month a
year."86 The opportunity cost of time has greatly increased as
citizens have devoted more time to work and less to leisure
activities. The extent to which voting must be "scheduled in" to a
busy day leads to renewed outcome-oriented thinking about voting,
creating conditions for the norm's erosion.
The voting norm hypothesis tells a plausible story about why
some people vote. The same could be said, however, for Uhlaner's
story about group leaders providing tangible benefits to group
alleys evidences a "more relaxed, less traditional pattern of social connection shaped
by the new ways American live and work"); see also Katha Pollitt, For Whom the Ball
Rolls, NATION, Apr. 15, 1996, at 9 (tracing bowling leagues of prior decades to
"specific forms of working-class and lower-middle-class life... that fostered group
solidarity, a marital ethos that permitted husbands plenty of boys' nights out, a lack
of cultural and entertainment alternatives" and arguing that people still bowl "with
friends, on dates, with their kids, with other families").
85 See Knack, supra note 41, at 143-48; see also TEIXEIRA, supra note 78, at 47-48
(observing that social connectedness, as measured by age, marital status and church
attendance, accounts for about half of the turnout decline predicted by Teixeira's
statistical analysis). Teixeira's proxies for social connectedness are weak, because
turnout may be correlated with these variables for all sorts of other reasons.
The literature on the U.S. turnout decline since 1960 is voluminous. See, e.g.,
Paul R. Abramson &John H. Aldrich, The Decline of Electoral Participation in America,
76 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 502 (1982) (attributing turnout decline in part to lowered
feelings of political efficacy). For a critique of this work and other explanations for
turnout decline, see Carol A. Cassel & Robert C. Luskin, Simple Explanations of
Turnout Decline, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1321, 1322-24 (1988) (criticizing Abramson
and Aldrich's study because it unreasonably oversimplifies voting variables); see also
Carol A. Cassel & David B. Hill, Explanations of Turnout Decline: A Multivariate Test,
9 AM. POL. Q. 181 (1981); Matsusaka, supra note 32, at 105-11 (explaining turnout
decline using informed voting theory).
86JUUET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN 29 (1991); see also Judy
Pasternak & Cathleen Decker, For Non- Voters, Ballot Box Offers No Representation, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at Al, A14 (noting that 21% of nonvoters say they are "just too
busy" to vote).
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members to encourage voting. The true test is comparing the story
with the evidence. As the next subpart shows, some evidence
supports the norms hypothesis, but there is not yet enough evidence
to eliminate rival hypotheses.
C. Evaluating the Empirical Evidence For
and Against a Norm of Voting
Certain testable propositions follow from the norm of voting
hypothesis. Perhaps most important is the proposition that a
person's propensity to vote should be positively correlated with
social sanctioning related to voting. Other testable propositions
include a finding that overall turnout decreases or increases as
social connectedness decreases or increases and that voting rates
will be lower among the least educated and politically powerless
members of society, who the norm of voting hypothesis predicts
should have less demand for the norm.
As this subpart shows, evidence demonstrates the correlation
between social sanctions and voting. Unfortunately, much of the
evidence may be consistent with a modified rational choice taste for
voting model as well. Although additional evidence may be adduced
to bolster the norms hypothesis, the nature of norms means
definitive results probably are impossible.
Rational choice scholars since Downs have noted the possible
role of social pressure in stimulating voting,"7 but Stephen Knack
is the first researcher to test systematically whether negative social
sanctions correlate positively with voting. 8  Knack began by
See DOWNS, supra note 12, at 7 (offering as an example a man who prefers party
A, but whose wife will throw a tantrum unless he votes for party B); see also HARDIN,
supra note 10, at 216-17; Niemi, supra note 37, at 117 (noting the "psychological cost
of saying 'no' when asked whether or not you voted"); Tullock, supra note 37, at 919
(arguing that people decide not to investigate whether they should stop voting
because the cost of voting is very slight and the cost of investigating is quite
expensive); Wittman, supra note 28, at 740 n.14 ("Embarrassment and other forms of
social pressure used in 'coercing' others with similar preferences to vote... may be
a relatively inexpensive method of getting a significant number of votes on your
side.").
' See Knack, supra note 41. The "social context" literature also examines the role
of social relationships in stimulatingvoting from the perspective of a potential voter's
social structure or network, usually at the neighborhood level. See, e.g., Heinz Eulau
& Lawrence Rothenberg, Life Space and Social Networks As Political Contexts, 8 POL.
BE-AV. 130, 151-52 (1986) (concluding that while the neighborhood as a geographic
unit is not a "perceptually salient environment for political behavior," social relations
among particular neighbors "result in an interpersonal context that has an impact on
political behavior"); Robert Huckfeldt &John Sprague, Networks in Context: The Social
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examining negative sanctioning in marriage, arguably the most
intense of social relationships. Research has long shown that
married people tend to have a higher voter turnout than unmarried
people. 9 That correlation does not reveal, however, whether
reduced information and transportation costs, sanctioning, or some
other factor correlated with marriage accounts for increased
turnout.
Knack designed the Social Sanctions Survey (SSS) to test the
effect of sanctioning on a spouses's voting. The SSS showed a 21%
increase in the probability of reporting that one's spouse had voted
among those respondents indicating that, on discovering that a
Flow of PoliticalInformation, 81 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 1197, 1213 (1987) (emphasizing the
"interdependence of private preference and politically relevant distributions in the
individual's social context"); Christopher B. Kenny, Political Participation and Effects
from the Social Environment, 36 AM.J. POL. ScI. 259, 259 (1992) (noting that "[s]ocial
contexts have been found to have important consequences for certain forms of
political participation"); Bruce C. Straits, Bringing Strong Ties Back In, 55 PUB.
OPINION Q. 432,433 (1991) (analyzing the frequency of political conversations within
core networks); M. Stephen Weatherford, InterpersonalNetworks and PoliticalBehavior,
26 AM. J. POL. SCi. 117, 117 (1982) (describing "local, neighborhood-based social
networks as influences on individual political attitudes"). Unfortunately, the social
context literature is unclear on the causal connection between social relationships and
voting. See Jan E. Leighley, Social Interaction and Contextual Influences on Political
Participation, 18 AM. POL. Q. 459, 472 (1990) ("The basic theory... argues that social
interaction enhances participation because it provides information and specific
opportunities as well as introduces the individual to others who act as role models.
Alternatively, social interaction itself could be considered another form of individual
initiative, and as such does not explain participation ... ."); Bruce C. Straits, The
Social Context of Voter Turnout, 54 PUB. OPINION Q. 64, 65 (1990) (arguing for a
"contagion" model of voting).
Rosenstone and Hansen use both the social context literature and the norms
literature to explain changes in voter turnout over time, although they fail to
distinguish between the two theories. See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 70, at
160 ("Citizens who are part of dense webs of association of the workplace, church,
and community receive more information and encounter more bountiful social
benefits."). They hypothesize that involvement in social life "brings greater exposure
to the mobilization efforts of political leaders" and that much of the decline in voter
turnout is explained by a decrease in these mobilization efforts. Id. at 88, 217-19.
Yet Rosenstone and Hansen provide no explanation for the origins or perpetuation
of social sanctioning, a prerequisite to mobilization, and they assume without any
evidence that social sanctioning occurs equally among all groups with identical
degrees of social connectedness. See id. at 228-29 ("People who occupy social
positions that expose them to information and to social incentives bear less
burdensome costs and receive more substantial benefits from their involvement in
public affairs.").
89 See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 40, at 44-46. Knack's analysis of the
NES data reveals that turnout is higher only for married respondents with a spouse
who has been to college; otherwise marital status has no independent effect on the
probability of voting. See Knack, supra note 41, at 138.
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friend did not vote in the last election, "I would disapprove and let
him or her know."g° This finding supports the norms hypothesis
by suggesting a causal relationship between negative sanctioning
and voting.
The survey design is open to some criticism, however. Knack
failed to verify the spouse's actual voting using voting records.
9t
Survey respondents had an incentive to lie in order to avoid some
embarrassment: Those respondents who stated that they would
communicate disapproval of nonvoting would be hard-pressed to
admit to a stranger conducting a survey that their disapproval would
be ineffective in motivating their spouse to vote.92 In addition,
Knack has examined the relationship between those willing to
express disapproval regarding a friend's decision not to vote and the
spouse's voting; a better test would have asked directly about
expressing disapproval to a spouse. People may be more or less
willing to express disapproval to a friend than to a spouse.
Green and Shapiro criticize Knack for failing to take into
account "the general level of political communication between
spouses.""3 In other words, Knack has not controlled fully for the
role of reduced information costs in marriage. Suppose, as John
Matsusaka argues, there is a taste for informed voting distributed in
the population; some people enjoy voting, but they vote only if they
feel they have enough information to make an informed choice.'
"Information transmission between couples is likely to be relatively
inexpensive because they are in frequent contact, have similar value
I Knacksupra note 41, at 139 ("[R]espondents were asked in the surveywhether,
on discovering that a friend did not vote in the election, 'I would disapprove and let
him or her know,' 'I would disapprove, and keep it to myself,' or 'It wouldn't matter
to me at all.'").
91 See id. For a discussion of verifying self-reports of voting, see infra note 105.
Knack downplays the potential for overreporting of a spouse's voting by
claiming that "[a] similar degree ofoverreporting should be associated with the choice
of Option 2 ... which also indicated disapproval of nonvoting. But passive
disapproval was associated with only a (not statistically significant) 12-point increase
in reported voting for spouses .... " Knack, supra note 41, at 139.
9o GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 67 n.25.
" See Matsusaka, supra note 32, at 92-93 (hypothesizing that "even if people
believe it is their duty to vote, rational citizens abstain if they feel unable to evaluate
the choices"); see also John M. Strate et al., Life Span Civic Development and Voting
Participation, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 443, 450-52 (1989) (testing a theory of "civic
competence" similar to Matsusaka's model). Both Matsusaka's theory and the norms
theory are consistent with Kenny's finding that people are more likely to vote when
the people with whom they discuss politics vote or put up political signs. See Kenny,
supra note 88, at 263-64.
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systems, and tend to trust each other."95 Without controlling for
political communication between spouses, we cannot comfortably
accept Knack's finding that negative sanctioning in marriage
explains higher voter turnout among married couples.
Knack also examined whether negative sanctions between
neighbors contributed to voting. The 42% of SSS respondents who
answered "yes" to the question, "Do you have any friends, neigh-
bors, or relatives who would be disappointed or angry with you if
they knew you had not voted in this year's election?,"' were more
likely to vote than those that answered "no." Indeed, a "yes" answer
to that question was the most powerful predictor of voting after
civic duty.9
This evidence further supports the norms theory by suggesting
a causal relationship between negative sanctions and voting.98 But
this evidence is consistent as well with a taste for voting theory not
dependent upon social norms. 99 Suppose, for example, that most
individuals' friends, neighbors, and relatives do not actually express
their disapproval for not voting, a possibility not ruled out by the
SSS question. Instead, respondents with a high sense of civic duty
(a full 70% of SSS respondents00 ) merely presume that others
would disapprove based on their own attitudes toward voting.
10 t
I Matsusaka, supra note 32, at 102; see also Laura Stoker & M. KentJennings, Life-
Cycle Transitions and Political Participation: The Case of Marriage, 89 AM. POL. SCL. REV.
421,429-30 (1995) (finding that a spouse's political activity or inactivity is correlated
with an individual's decision to vote and that marriage transitions-marriage, divorce,
and widowhood-account for an short-term decrease in political participation).
96 Knack, supra note 41, at 142.
7 See id. at 141-42. Knack also found that "respondents claiming to 'know and
occasionally talk to' three or more people in their neighborhoods were significantly
more likely to have voted than those knowing two or fewer." Id. at 141. This
evidence, however, is equally consistent with Matsusaka's informed voting hypothesis.
See Matsusaka, supra note 32, at 92-93.
98 Knack verified most self-reports of voting through an examination of elections
board data. See Stephen F. Knack, Essays on Electoral Participation: Some Neglected
Costs and Benefits of Voting 149 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Maryland (College Park)) (on file with author). His method of administering the
survey, however, was nonrandom: 110 of the 289 residents were interviewed on their
way into or out of the polls on election day, and "[m]ost of the remainder of the
sample were surveyed door-to-door after election day within [the precincts studied];
a smaller number of surveys were administered at shopping malls in or adjacent to
the neighborhoods." Id.
9' Although neighbors may also be a source of information about voting (lending
credence to the Matsusaka hypothesis), Knack controlled for this variable in his study.
See Knack, supra note 41, at 142.
100 See id.
101 See Pettit, supra note 45, at 739-40.
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Does Knack's evidence demonstrate norm internalization as the
product of social sanctioning or as merely a randomly (but preva-
lently) distributed taste for voting?'
0 2
Despite the problems with Knack's study, he should be com-
mended for his effort. It is difficult to imagine a survey design that
could adequately test for the presence of norm internalization. It
cannot be done merely by asking about actual sanctioning. If many
people have internalized the norm, actual sanctioning might be rare
because compliance with the norm could be high. °'0
Knack's research includes the only direct tests that I am aware
of regarding the role of social sanctions in stimulating voting."'
Other evidence consistent with the norms hypothesis exists,
however. On average, about 25% of nonvoters in the validated NES
voting surveys intentionally or otherwise misrepresented their voting
behavior, compared to an average of only 1% of voters who said
they did not vote."' Fear of a stranger's disapproval is the only
10 Knack suggests that internalization is quickly reversed when sanctions are
removed. See Knack, supra note 41, at 146-47.
101 Thus, I am not as sanguine as Knack that long-term time series data on
interpersonal pressures will fully resolve the question. See id. at 148. In another
article, Knack found that poor weather conditions do not deter those voters with a
high sense of civic duty; only those with low civic duty respond to bad weather by not
voting. See Steve Knack, Does Rain Help the Republicans? Theory and Evidence on
Turnout and the Vote, 79 PUB. CHoICE 187, 202 (1994). Perhaps those with high civic
duty internalized a norm to the extent that they do not weigh the costs of voting.
Alternatively, perhaps these people have a strong taste for voting.
1' The other testable proposition flowing from the norms hypothesis, that voting
rates will be lower among the least educated and the poorest, is certainly true as an
empirical matter. See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 40, at 17 (finding a very
strong relationship between rates of voting and years of education); id. at 25 (finding
that income is related to turnout, having the greatest effect on those who have not
graduated from college). But we would see the same effect under Matsusaka's
informed voting model: Education gives a person a better understanding of politics
and the world, as well as teaching the value of acquiring additional information to
make an informed choice. See Matsusaka, supra note 32, at 105 (predicting that
turnout will correlate with income under his model). Further proof of the third
proposition is useless because it does not eliminate rival hypotheses.
Pomper and Sernekos have found a positive correlation between those integrated
into their communities (as measured by home ownership, church attendance, etc.)
and the likelihood of voting. See Gerald M. Pomper & Loretta A. Sernekos, The
"Bake Sale" Theory of Voting Participation 2 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) ("People who vote are more likely to be people who patronize bake
sales .... Both acts are expressions of community solidarity, a sharing and a ritual.").
Their data are equally consistent with the norms hypothesis or the informed voting
hypothesis, however, because those integrated in their communities are likely to have
low-cost access to political information.
"o5 See Brian D. Silver et al., Who Overreports Voting?, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 613,
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reasonable hypothesis to explain why nonvoters were much more
likely to lie and say that they voted than voters were to lie and say
that they did not vote. Explaining this phenomenon as nonvoters'
attempts to avoid social sanctions is all the more plausible given the
finding that "Americans who are more highly educated and more
politically efficacious, who have a stronger sense of citizen duty and
stronger partisan attachments, and who are more concerned about
the outcome of the election, are also more likely to overreport vot-
ing."106 Thus, those most likely to have been exposed to the norm
of voting are also the most likely to attempt to avoid expected
negative sanctioning by the surveyor.
Evidence from cognitive psychologists also bolsters the norms
hypothesis over the rational choice taste for informed voting
hypothesis. Riker and Ordeshook have suggested that many people
misperceive p, the probability of casting a decisive vote in an
election." 7 Although this may be true, misperception would have
613-14 (1986). In addition, African-American nonvoters who were interviewed for the
NES presidential surveys by African-American interviewers were more likely to report
falsely that they voted than African-American nonvoters interviewed by white
interviewers. See Barbara A. Anderson et al., The Effects of Race of the Interviewer on
Measures of Electoral Participation By Blacks in SRC National Election Studies, 52 PUB.
OPINION Q. 53, 54 (1988) (noting that "research demonstrates that whether the
respondent and the interviewer are of the same race affects responses on items
related to race, such as expressed hostility or closeness toward members of different
racial groups"). The authors suggest that the effect occurs because the interview
"may stimulate concern about how the election outcome could affect the respondent
and other members of his or her race, and could stimulate the respondent's sense of
civic obligation to vote." Id. at 71.
" Silver et al., supra note 105, at 614. Pre-election interviews themselves stimulate
voting, with estimates ranging from a two percent increase among those surveyed to
a doubling of turnout. See Donald R. Kinder & David 0. Sears, Public Opinion and
Political Action, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 659, 703 (Gardner Lindzey
& Elliot Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985); see also Anderson et al., supra note 105, at 71-73
(noting that African-Americans living in certain areas were more likely to vote if
interviewed before the election by another African-American rather than by a white
interviewer). That pre-election interviewing stimulates voting is consistent with both
the norms hypothesis and with the informed voting hypothesis.
107 Riker and Ordeshook state:
It is likely that, for many people, the subjective estimate of P is higher than
is reasonable, given the objective circumstances. Subjected as we are to
constant reminders that a few hundred carefully selected votes by nonvoters
could reverse the results of very close elections, such as the Presidential
election of 1960, the subjectively estimated chance of a tie (i.e., P) may be
high as the propaganda urges it to be, even though in objective calculations
the chance of a tie may be low.
Riker & Ordeshook, supra note 20, at 38-39; see also Uhlaner, Downsian Voter, supra
note 42, at 77 ("The pB term has the form of a very low probability of winning a large
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to be severe to account for much voting.'0 8 But a more subtle,
related cognitive error may be at work, what Quattrone and Tversky
have termed the voter's illusion:
[P]eople often fail to distinguish between causal contingencies
(acts that produce an outcome) and diagnostic contingencies (acts
that are merely correlated with an outcome). For example, there
is a widespread belief that attitudes are correlated with actions.
Therefore, some people may reason that if they decide to vote,
that decision would imply that others with similar political
attitudes would also decide to vote. Similarly, they may reason
that if they decide to abstain, others who share their political
attitudes will also abstain. Because the preferred candidates can
defeat the opposition only if politically like-minded citizens vote
in greater numbers than do politically unlike-minded citizens, the
individual may infer that he or she had better vote; that is, each
citizen may regard his or her single vote as diagnostic of millions
of votes, which would substantially inflate the subjective probabil-
ity of one's vote making a difference.
109
Using an ingenious study design," 0 Quattrone and Tversky
amount; thus, people overestimate the value of the gamble. The cost term actually
summarizes a series of moderate probability low-cost chance events, such as that a
voter has a long wait at the polls or that he or she missed out on something else while
voting. Thus, costs are likely to be underestimated. The net effect would be to
produce more voting.").
108 Suppose that people misperceive by 1000 times the value ofp. Using the actual
value of p = 10 in a presidential election, that would make the perceived value of
p = 10', hardly a figure that could account for much voting. See supra note 25.
10' George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological
Analyses of Political Choice, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 719, 733 (1988) [hereinafter
Quattrone & Tversky, Contrasting]. The authors first summarized their results in
George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Causal Versus Diagnostic Contingencies: On Self.
Deception and on the Voter's Illusion, 46J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 244-47
(1984). For an example of a parallel illusion that may explain participation in groups
like the antinuclear power movement, see Edward N. Muller & Karl-Dieter Opp,
Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 471, 484-85
(1986).
10 Quattrone and Tversky conducted an experiment in which participants
read about an imaginary country named Delta. Participants were to imagine
that they supported party A, opposed party B, and that there were roughly
four million supporters of each party in Delta as well as four million non-
aligned voters. Subjects imagined that they were deliberating over whether
to vote in the upcoming presidential election, having learned that voting in
Delta can be costly in time and effort.
Quattrone & Tversky, Contrasting, supra note 109, at 733. Participants were told to
consult one of two prevailing theories concerning the election outcome. Some
participants were told that nonaligned voters would split their vote and the electoral
outcome would be determined by whether supporters of A or B became more
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demonstrated that the voter's illusion is prevalent, thereby explain-
ing the ubiquity of a common, nonrational argument: "'If you don't
vote ... think of what would happen if everyone felt the same
way.'"
i t
Quattrone and Tversky's experiment undercuts any rational
voting model by positing cognitive error in thep term as a plausible
explanation for much voting. What may be less clear is how
their experiment supports the norms hypothesis.'" The voter's
illusion constitutes a "useful myth" that stimulates voting, much like
Ellickson's cattlemen who had false beliefs about the effect of
closed-range laws on liability.1 Widespread false belief in the
causal efficacy of voting reinforces a norm of voting, providing a
involved in the election. "The political experts were split as to whether the
supporters of A or B would become more involved, but all agreed that the party
whose members did become more involved would win by a margin of roughly 200
thousand to 400 thousand votes." Id. Other participants were told a nearly identical
story, except that the supporters ofA and B were expected to vote in equal numbers,
and the electoral outcome would be determined by whether nonaligned voters
supported primarily party A or B. "The experts were split as to which party would
capture the majority of the nonaligned voters, but all agreed that the fortunate party
would win by a margin of at least 200 thousand votes." Id.
Rational choice theory predicts that the participants' decision to vote should be
about equal in the two groups. Assuming psychic benefits of voting (D) are
distributed randomly in the population, all other variables are held constant. Costs
(C) and benefits of an electoral victory (B) are the same for each voter, and the
probability of effecting the election outcome (p) is minuscule, given that in both
elections experts agree the margin of victory will be at least 200,000 votes.
Nonetheless, turnout depended upon which theory respondents received, with 16%
of those given the first theory indicating they would not vote but only 7% of those
given the second theory so indicating. See id. at 734.
Even more interestingly, when respondents were asked to indicate (assuming no
communication between voters) "how likely it was that the supporters of party A
would vote in greater numbers than the supporters of party B 'given that you decided
to vote' and 'given that you decided to abstain,'" those exposed to the first theory
"thought that their individual choice would have a greater 'effect' on what others
decided to do than did subjects exposed to the [second] theory." Id. "Similar effects
were observed in responses to a question probing how likely party A was to defeat
party B 'given that you decided to vote' and 'given that you decided to abstain'....
Id.
". Id. at 734.
11 For a detailed examination of how cognitive error is inconsistent with economic
rationality, see Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency UnderlnformationalAsymmetty:
The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391 (1990).
... I am grateful to Jim Lindgren for suggesting that cognitive error reinforces,
rather than undercuts, the norms hypothesis.
..4 See ELUCKSON, supra note 9, at 118-19; see also McAdams, supra note 62, at
1064-71. I suspect that the "useful myth" phenomenon may be one of the key
psychological links in the process of norm internalization generally.
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backup mechanism for voting when social sanctioning and internal-
ization fail. Thus, when the decision to vote becomes outcome-
oriented due to the norm's weakness, the quasi-rational calculus is
skewed in favor of voting by the useful myth that one person's vote
causally affects how many others vote as well; the pB term is
replaced in the voter's calculus with a term npB, where n represents
the number of other voters a voter expects to affect by her decision
to vote. Under this quasi-rational model, it often will be "rational"
to vote.
115
To be sure, some of the evidence adduced in this subpart to
support the norms hypothesis has a ring of ad hoc'ery (or at the
very least, post hoc'ery). But we cannot expect to do much better
given the difficulty in research design for testing the existence of a
voting norm. The best we can do is continue to search for examples
that falsify either the norms hypothesis or competing theories.
II. COMPULSORY VOTING AND THE QUESTIONABLE
SUBSTITUTABILITY OF NORMS AND LAW
A. Introduction
Unlike the first Part of this Article, the goal of which was to
examine critically the existence of a norm to explain the paradox of
voting, this Part conducts a thought experiment by assuming for the
sake of argument that the evidence adduced above proves the
existence of a voting norm. In this Part, I demonstrate that if the
norms hypothesis is correct, state-based mechanisms that seek to
duplicate norms may be warranted, but they are likely to be
successful only to the extent that norms and laws are good substi-
tutes for one another. I examine the substitutability issue below,
first generally and then with regard to a proposal for compulsory
voting.
The consistent decline in American voter turnout over the past
decades" 6 has led to calls for increasing turnout. Some people
advocate programs to increase turnout because they support the
political reform goal of egalitarian pluralism, that is, the redistribu-
15 Suppose that people think their vote affects a million other voters in a
presidential election, or n = 1,000,000. Again using a value of p = 10' in a
presidential election, the term npB becomes 1,000,000(10')B, or 0.01B, quite a
substantial number if an election outcome, B, is worth something significant to a
voter. See supra notes 25, 105.
11 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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tion of political capital in rough proportion to the interests of
society's members.' 7 Wealthier, better-educated whites are more
likely to vote than other groups in society;1 8 egalitarian pluralists
hope to increase turnout among groups with low turnout so that
each group has a better ability to affect the outcome of elec-
tions. n 9
For those who reject the concept of egalitarian pluralism,
government intervention to stimulate turnout may be justified on
the narrower ground that it overcomes the other collective action
problem associated with voting, legitimating democratic govern-
ment. Of course, this second ground is much more controversial:
It is hardly self-evident that a government program forcing voting
would increase a societal belief in the legitimacy of government.
According to the norms hypothesis, the presence or absence of
a voting norm accounts for much of the difference in voter turnout
among groups and the decline of voter turnout generally. Commu-
nities with well-educated members who already benefit from the
system of government are more likely to demand and later develop
a norm of voting than communities with members who faced
disenfranchisement and formidable legal and illegal barriers to
voting.2' In addition, the decline of social connectedness and the
increased opportunity cost of time have led in recent decades to the
erosion of the voting norm in those communities having such a
norm.
121
Both of these problems could be solved ideally through a
program that creates or re-creates the voting norm. Creating such
a norm directly, however, is all but impossible: Someone must
n Seegenerally Hasen, supra note 7, at 4-6 (arguing for campaign finance vouchers
as a method to further egalitarian pluralism).
I18 See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 70, at 43-45; see also STANDING COMM.
ON LAW AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF
THE AMERICAN VOTER REVISITED 93-94 (1990) [hereinafter AMERICAN BAR ASS'N].
19 See Malcolm M. Feeley, A Solution to the "Voting Dilemma" in Modern Democratic
Theoy, 84 ETHICS 235, 241 (1974) (advocating compulsory voting "to eliminate some
of the inefficiencies.., caused by unequal distributions of income, division of labor,
informally administered selective benefits, and skewed assessments of costs"); Alan
Wertheimer, In Defense of Compulsoy Voting, in PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS 276, 292-93
(J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1975) (noting that compulsory voting
would lead "the poor and uneducated" to "act in their common interests," making
compulsory voting "more consistent with social justice than is our present system").
For some classic arguments against compulsory voting, see HENRY J. ABRAHAM,
COMPULSORY VOTING (1955).12 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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stimulate demand for voting over a long period through some sort
of value inculcation program and ensure adequate "social connect-
edness."" Given the impossibility of centrally directing an
inherently decentralized process, a more plausible alternative
requires the state to take over the role of social sanctioner directly.
If the state uses the law to offer rewards or punishments for voting,
perhaps state sanctioning, like social sanctioning, will lead to
internalization of a taste for voting.
Whether state sanctioning leads to internalization is the crucial
question. To understand why, consider again the contrast between
the norms hypothesis and the rational choice hypothesis. Although
both hypotheses predict an increase in voting if the state imposes
fines for nonvoting, the long term prospects for state sanctioning
differ. If the rational choice model is correct, a temporary penalty
would increase turnout only temporarily. Once the penalty is
removed or enforcement levels are decreased, old voting patterns
reemerge; there is no internalization because the rational choice
model cannot account for a change in tastes."2 In contrast, if the
norms model is correct and norms and law are substitutes for one
another, state sanctioning could shape preferences through
internalization so that turnout would remain high even if the state
eventually removed or lessened such penalties.
In short, the norms hypothesis predicts a greater payoff for state
action-a long term increase in turnout-making government
intervention in the voting decision morejustifiable. This conclusion
is only correct, however, to the extent that state sanctioning is a
good substitute for a social norm.
" For a similar view, see Pomper & Sernekos, supra note 104, at 30 ("Ultimately,
higher turnout may well depend on a long-term rebuilding of American communi-
ties-a difficult task, and perhaps an impossible one."). But see TEIXEIRA, supra note
78, at 155 ("Clearly people cannot (or should not) be made to get older, get married,
attend church, or stay in the same place.").
12 See Stigler & Becker, supra note 30, at 76 (arguing that "tastes neither change
capriciously nor differ importantly between people"). For an argument in favor of
preference-shaping within the law and economics paradigm, see Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law As a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990
DUKE L.J. 1; see also Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions As More Than Prices: The
Economic Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS:
NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 153 (R. Malloy & C. Braun eds., 1995) (arguing
from an autonomy perspective in favor of limited government preference shaping).
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B. Norms and Law As Alternative Means of Social Control
Although Robert Ellickson was not the first scholar to observe
that social norms and law are alternative methods of social con-
trol,124 his detailed examination of norms among neighbors in
Shasta County demonstrated that norms maximizing a group's
welfare may emerge not only in the absence of law, but also despite
the existence of contrary law. 125  Ellickson concluded that "law-
makers who are unappreciative of the social conditions that foster
informal cooperation are likely to create a world in which there is
both more law and less order."
126
Ellickson's study shows the undesirability (and sometimes
futility) of legislating contrary to an established social norm. But
here we are faced with the opposite problem: a norm has failed to
emerge in some communities even though a group's welfare
arguably would be maximized if the norm existed. 127 Moreover,
the voting norm's overall decline has led to conditions that could
threaten the legitimacy of democratic government. In this situation
of what might be called social failure, law may be the pathway to
order, not an obstacle to it.
The law may cure social failure in two ways. First, and most
obviously, law changes behavior through rewards and penalties that
alter an individual's instrumental calculus along the lines of the
rational choice hypothesis. I may want to drive eighty miles per
hour on an empty freeway, but I do not do so if the punishment I
expect exceeds the benefits I get from speeding.
Second, law works in a more subtle way as well, by shaping
124 See e.g., Donald T. Campbell, Legal and Primary-Group Social Controls, 5J. Soc.
BIOLOGICAL STRUcTURES 431,434 (1982) (arguing that the four mechanisms of social
control are mutual monitoring, internalized restraint, legal control, and market
mechanisms).
" For Ellickson's general observations on the benefits of norms over laws, see
ELLicKSON, supra note 9, at 249-58.
"2 Id. at 286. Although Ellickson claims to limit his argument to norms among
close-knit groups, the evidence he presents indicates that norms may emerge in a
broader social context as well. See HerbertJacob, 1 LAw & POL. BOOK REV. 125, 126
(1991) (reviewing ELUCKSON, supra note 9) (noting that "the contemporary American
professoriate which extends over many disciplines and across an entire continent"
cannot be considered a tight-knit group as Ellickson implicitly assumes), available in
gopher://nuinfo.nwu.edu:70/11/library/journal.
'" To give a more mundane example of the same phenomenon, why has a norm
against rubber-necking on the highway failed to emerge? For an interesting
discussion of the phenomenon, see THOMAS C. SCHELUNG, MICROMOTIVES &
MACROBEHAVIOR 124-33 (1978).
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preferences (or changing tastes) in much the same way as social
norms. I may not drive eighty miles per hour either because I
believe that following the law is the right thing to do or because the
law shapes my preferences so that I come to believe that driving
eighty miles per hour is wrong. Tyler indicates that many people
obey the law not because of any instrumental calculus and not out of
respect for either the courts or the police-indeed, many respon-
dents in his Chicago survey had respect for neither institution.
Instead, respondents follow the law because they believe that
following the law itself is right.'28 A law represents some kind of
social consensus about acceptable behavior in much the same
manner as social norms.
On this view, strict enforcement of many laws may be unneces-
sary; the state, by passing a law, causes people to internalize a
preference about acceptable behavior. The scant need for enforce-
ment of most laws indicates that such internalization is common.
As Donald Campbell noted:
[I]t is remarkable that [legal control] ever worked. As a pure
form, without mutual monitoring or internalized restraint, with all
detection of non-compliance and delivery of sanctions delegated
to specialists, the required size of this specialist corps becomes
unaffordably large, even if the self-interests and nepotistic biasses
of these legal-control specialists is disregarded.
One must conclude that legal social control can only have
worked well when supported by mutual monitoring and internal-
ized restraint.1
29
Tyler's evidence suggests that the law may serve as a social
sanctioner of last resort and that legal control works principally
through a law's enactment, not its enforcement; enactment affects
internalization, whereas enforcement affects only the instrumental
calculus. Thus, state-centered laws theoretically may act like
decentralized norms in shaping preferences. As the next subpart
shows, however, the substitutability of the two methods of social
control is a much trickier issue than first appears.
12s See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 40-56 (1990) (presenting data
that "suggests a general feeling among respondents that law breaking is morally
wrong" and a "perceived obligation to obey the law").
'2 Campbell, supra note 124, at 437 (emphasis omitted).
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C. Compulsory Voting Laws As a Substitute
for a Norm of Voting
1. Carrots or Sticks?
As noted in the Introduction, governments have used both
carrots and sticks to stimulate voting since voting began in ancient
Athens. The use of red-dyed ropes would be impracticable and
certainly undesirable as a substitute for a norm of voting today. But
what about other methods used by modem democratic governments
to stimulate voting?
In practice, sticks triumph over carrots.3 ' Compulsory voting
laws are the primary device used by modern democracies to
stimulate voting. Such laws require that a citizen vote in an election
unless the citizen has an excuse for not voting. Penalties for not
voting without an excuse range from Australia's imposition of a
fifty-dollar fine,' to Greece's penalty of imprisonment from one
to twelve months. 32 Italy's penalty of posting nonvoters' names
on the communal notice board is particularly interesting in that its
sole purpose appears to generate shame for nonvoting; there are no
tangible costs associated with it.133 Moreover, Italy has the highest
"s I am not aware of a democratic government since Ancient Athens that has paid
its citizens to vote. But cf. The Concept of National Voter Registration: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Census and Statistics of the House Comm. on Post Oflice and Civil Service,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1972) (statement of Rep. Udall) (suggesting possible
payment to stimulate voting). Crewe notes that "a provision unique to Italy makes
generous concessions on train fares available to those who have to return to their
home constituency to vote, a real benefit to migrant workers in the North or beyond
Italy's frontiers who wish to spend a few days with their families in Sicily and the
South." Ivor Crewe, Electoral Participation, in DEMOCRACY AT THE POLLS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COMPETITIVE NATIONAL ELECTIONS 216,241 (David Butler
et al. eds., 1981). In an effort to provide a carrot for voting, Kentucky recently began
posting the names of those who voted, to "'affirm those folks (who voted) and say
(voting) is a civic responsibility.'" Richard Wilson, State Elections Board Will Distribute
Lists of Those Who Voted, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 25, 1995, at 2B (quoting
elections board member John Chowning), available in 1995 WL 2331165, at *1.
Efforts to encourage voting in California are not state-sponsored. See supra note 5
and accompanying text.
' See Commonwealth Electoral Legislation Amendment Act of 1983, sec. 99,
§ 128A, 1983 AUSTL. ACTS No. 143, available in LEXIS, Codes Library, Ausact File.
'52 See Phaeodo Vegleris, Greek Electoral Law, in GREECE AT THE POLLS: THE
NATIONAL ELECTIONS OF 1974 AND 1977, at 21,28 (Howard R. Penniman ed., 1981).
Greek law additionally provides for onerous administrative penalties. See id.
.. See supra note 4. The other Italian penalty is having one's certificate of good
conduct stamped "Did not vote." See supra note 4. Although the certificate has "now
largely fallen into disuse," Sani, supra note 4, at 43 n.25, "such a procedure in a
country with a long tradition of bureaucratic control helps to spread a conviction that
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average voter turnout among Western democracies.
13 4
Despite the wide range of stated penalties, lax enforcement is
ubiquitous.1 5  In Australia, perhaps four percent of nonvoters
incur a penalty of some type."3 6 In Belgium, less than one quarter
of one percent of nonvoters are even prosecuted. 3 7 In Greece,
the penalty of jail time apparently is not imposed at all.' Yet the
voting is not only a right but a public duty and that failure to exercise the right might
have unfortunate consequences." GioRGio GALLI & ALFONSO PRANDI, PATrERNS OF
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN ITALY 28 (1970); see also Wolfinger et al., supra note 4,
at 562 ("What prudent Italian would risk blighting his chances of favorable
consideration by a government official?"). Sani argues that a relatively small decline
in Italian turnout might be attributable to these minor sanctions having lost their
force. See Sani, supra note 4, at 43. But see ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY
WORK: CiviC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 93 (1993) (explaining lower turnout in
Italian national referenda compared to parliamentary elections by the absence in
referenda (and presence in parliamentary elections) of "uncivic motivations" for
voting, such as the compulsory voting law, the influence of party organizations, and
political patronage).
13 See G. Bingham Powell, Jr., American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective,
80 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 17 app. at 38 (1986). Other scholars using different figures or
methodology give slightly different turnout percentages across states. All the
comparative studies of turnout that I have seen, however, place states with
compulsory voting at or near the top of the list and the United States near the
bottom.
IS
5 See Crewe, supra note 130, at 240 ("In reality, in the countries where voting is
compulsory, both convictions and sanctions against nonvoters appear to be negligible,
except perhaps in Venezuela."); Robert W. Jackman, Political Institutions and Voter
Turnout in the Industrial Democracies, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 405, 409 (1987)
(attributing turnout percentages below 100% in states with compulsory voting to lax
enforcement); Richard Rose, Elections and Electoral Systems: Choices and Alternatives,
in DEMOCRACY & ELECTIONS, supra note 4, at 20, 26 (noting that among states with
compulsory voting laws, "penalties for voting are slight and rarely enforced").
" See Stephen Kirchner, Compulsory Voting in Australia: The Case for Reform
4 (June 19, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Murphy v.
Australian Electoral Comm'n, No. Q93/585AAT (Administrative App. Trib. May 24,
1994), available in LEXIS, Aust Library, Ausmax File (denying a request under
Australian Freedom of Information Act for documents containing policy and
guidelines used by the Australian Electoral Commission to determine whether a
reason given for not voting is a "sufficient reason" under Australian law); J.D.B.
MILLER, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 101 (1954) (noting that compulsory
voting "results in polls of over 90%, and a few people being fined nominal sums for
not voting").137 See Crewe, supra note 130, at 240; see also Keith Hill, Belgium: Political Change
in a Segmented Society, in ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: A COMPARATIVE HANDBOOK 29, 59
(Richard Rose ed., 1974) ("Between 1946 and the period after the election of 1961
only 0.24% of all abstainers were prosecuted, and only 0.20% convicted.").
" I have been unable to locate any scholarly studies of Greek enforcement rates.
George Tsebelis informs me that those who do not vote may have minor difficulties
renewing a passport, but a medical excuse for not voting usually clears up the
problem. Personal Communication from George Tsebelis to Author (on file with
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democracies with compulsory voting laws have among the highest
turnouts among the industrialized democracies: Australia, 86%;139
Belgium, 88%;140 Greece, 78.6%;"' and Italy, 94%.142 This
compares to an average turnout of 54% for the United States for the
same period. 143  Turnout was about ten to thirteen percentage
points higher on average in democracies with penalties for nonvot-
ing compared to those without penalties.
14 4
The evidence of high voter turnout in the absence of much
enforcement suggests that compulsory voting laws serve much the
same function as a social norm of voting. 14  Although Kaempfer
and Lowenberg argue that a compulsory voting law may reflect the
existing political system as well as constitute an independent cause
author).
I See Powell, supra note 134, at 38.
140 See id.
141 See Wolfinger et al., supra note 4, at 553 thl. 1. The 78.6% figure represents
voting as a percentage of registered voters, not as a percentage of the voting age
population. Using population figures obtained from a different source, the authors
reached the anomalous conclusion that 84.9% of Greece's voting age population (as
opposed to the percentage of registered voters) voted in Greece's most recent
national election. See id. The authors calculated the percentage of voters among the
voting age population in other states as follows: Australia, 83.1%; Belgium, 88.7%;
Italy, 94%; and the United States, 52.6%. See id.
" See Powell, supra note 134, at 38. Compulsory voting is also used in parts of
Austria and Switzerland. See id. at 20.
14. See id. at 38. This figure is for presidential elections. In the 1994 congres-
sional elections, voter turnout reached an all-time low, representing only 44.6% of the
total voting age population. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 289 tbl. 459 (1995). By race or ethnicity, 46.9% of
Whites voted, compared to only 37% of Blacks, and 19.1% of Hispanics. See id.
" See Andre Blais & R.K. Carty, Does Proportional Representation Foster Turnout?,
18 EUR.J. POL. RES. 167,176 (1990) (noting that compulsory voting increases turnout
by 12%); Jackman, supra note 135, at 415 (13%); Powell, supra note 134, at 9-10
(10%). Hirczy argues that these cross-national studies do not prove that compulsory
voting laws cause an increase in turnout; they only show a correlation. See Wolfgang
Hirczy, The Impact of Mandatoy Voting Laws on Turnout: A Quasi.Experimental
Approach, 13 ELECTORAL STUD. 64, 65 (1994). To better gauge the impact of
compulsory voting laws, Hirczy looked at changes in turnout within nations that
adopted or repealed compulsory voting laws. He concluded that compulsory voting
laws have a strong effect on turnout, but the increase in turnout following enactment
of a compulsory voting law is likely to be larger if the turnout before enactment was
low. See id. at 74-75.
'" Alternatively, it is possible that people overestimate the amount of enforce-
ment. If this were so, voting in the face of these penalties would appear more
rational. Kirchner maintains that the Australian Electoral Commission deliberately
creates uncertainties about the costs of not voting by publicizing that voting is
compulsory but not publicizing the relatively small penalty. Personal Communication
from Stephen Kirchner to Author (Apr. 1, 1996) (on file with the author).
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of turnout,' 6 there is no doubt that compulsory voting laws affect
turnout, whatever the original impetus for the law. For example,
when the Netherlands repealed compulsory voting, turnout declined
by an initial rate of sixteen percent, and it has remained ten percent
lower on average than voting turnout under the compulsory voting
law. 4 7 Similarly, voting increased by about fifteen percent when
Costa Rica introduced penalties for not voting.
1 48
Why the prevalence of sticks over carrots among those govern-
ments using law to increase turnout? One simple answer is that
sticks, if enforcement is low, are likely to be cheaper than carrots.
Payment to voters in ancient Athens was apparently the biggest item
in the budget. 14 Because it would be difficult for the government
to price-discriminate and pay only those voters who would not have
voted absent payment, all citizens must receive payment. In
contrast, a compulsory voting law stimulates voting among those
citizens who otherwise would not vote, but it does not discourage
others who would have voted anyway from voting. 5'
Sticks have the additional advantage over carrots of making
internalization of the voting requirement more likely. A half-dozen
Yum-Yum doughnuts does not send the same message to a voter as
does a government law compelling all to vote. The doughnut
inspires an outcome-oriented calculus; the law suggests moral
authority or social consensus.
'" See William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, A Threshold Model ofElectoral
Policy and Voter Turnout, 5 RATIONALITY & Soc'v 107, 108 (1993) ("[G]overnment
compulsion policies ... regarding voting and registration ... are themselves a
function of the degree of party polarization in the polity, and a function of the degree
to which proportional representation is used in elections.").
147 See G. Bingham Powell,Jr., Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies: Partisan, Lega
and Socio-Economic Influences, in ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 5, 10 (Richard Rose ed., 1980); see also Galen Irwin, Compulsoy Voting
Legislation: Impact on Voter Turnout in the Netherlands, 7 COMP. POL. STUD. 292, 294
(1974) ("The large drop in turnout only a few weeks after the repeal of [compulsory
voting] legislation leaves little doubt that the change was due to the change in the law
and not to external factors.").14' See Powell, supra note 147, at 100.
'4g See HANSEN, supra note 2, at 133.
's' For an analogous argument in another context, compare WILLIAM M. LANDES
& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 146-48 (1987)
(suggesting altruists would be less likely to rescue in the presence of a duty-to-rescue
law, leading to a decline in the number of rescues) with Richard L. Hasen, The
Efficient Duty to Rescue, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 141 (1995) (disputing such a claim).
VOTING WITHOUT LAW?
2. Why Compulsory Voting Will Not Be Enacted
in the United States
Compulsory voting in federal elections 51-particularly compul-
sory voting with an option for a voter to abstain from voting for a
candidate once at the polls 52-could serve as a good substitute for
the declining and unequally distributed voting norm in the United
States. 53 Nonetheless, compulsory voting has virtually no chance
of enactment in the United States.
Although Georgia and Virginia experimented with compulsory
"I Because I do not believe a compulsory voting law would be considered
seriously in the United States, I do not provide a detailed rationale here for limiting
compulsory voting to federal elections. It is enough to note that (1) federal elections
are in some senses the most important elections in terms of reaffirming the legitimacy
of American government (although certainly local elections have more immediate
impact on many citizens' daily lives); and (2) federal elections are relatively infrequent
in number and involve relatively short ballots, making the costs of voting and making
an informed decision relatively low.
'" See Feeley, supra note 119, at 241-42 (advocating compulsory voting with a "no-
preference" choice); cf. Faderson v. Bridger, 126 C.L.R. 271 (1971) (Austl.) (stating
that a voter's explanation that he has no preference among the candidates offering
themselves for election to the Australian Senate is not a "valid and sufficient reason"
for failing to vote under Australian law); Judd v. McKeon, 38 C.L.R. 381 (1926)
(Austl.) (same). Butsee Chris Puplick, The Casefor Compulsory Voting, in 2 AUSTRALIAN
ELECTORAL COMM'N, THE PEOPLE'S SAY-ELECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA 22 (1994)
("Compulsory voting is something of a misnomer. What the law requires is that an
elector turn up at a polling booth and take a ballot paper. They are not compelled
to fill in that ballot paper and have an absolute right not to vote by placing a blank
or spoiled ballot paper in the ballot box."). Although Australia has relatively high
levels of invalid ballots (averaging 2.7% of ballots cast, compared to 0.9% in Canada
and 2.1% in the Netherlands), political protest apparently accounts for few of these
ballots. See Ian McAllister, Institutions, Society or Protest, Explaining Invalid Votes in
Australian Elections, 12 ELECTORAL STUD. 23, 24 (1993); see also TimothyJ. Powell &
J. Timmons Roberts, Compulsoty Voting, Invalid Ballots, and Abstention in Brazil, 48
POL. RES. Q. 795, 816-20 (1995) (finding that political protest explains only some of
the invalid ballots cast, and that the complexity of the ballot provides a better
explanation). For a discussion of the benefits of an abstention option, see infra note
165 and accompanying text.
, One may wonder why a less drastic alternative, such as universal voter
registration, could not accomplish the same goal. The problem is that easing voter
registration may not be enough. In their recent study of the effects of the so-called
"motor-voter" bill, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), Highton and
Wolfinger conclude that the act's provisions easing registration are likely to have little
impact on turnout of those who take little or no interest (or those with high interest)
in the political system. Instead, the NVRA "ought to have their greatest impact on
individuals with moderate levels of motivation." Benjamin Highton & Raymond E.
Wolfinger, Anticipating the Effects of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993,
at 27 (Aug. 31, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Highton and
Wolfinger estimate that the provision of NVRA allowing for voter registration at
motor vehicle departments should increase national turnout by 8.7%. See id. at 13.
1996] 2173
2174 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 2135
voting laws in the eighteenth century," history records no mod-
em compulsory voting laws in the United States. Most Americans
with whom I discuss the idea, including academics, bristle at the
thought of such a law: "Compulsory voting is fundamentally
inconsistent with the individualism of American political cul-
ture;"  it is "antithetical to American values."156 Although
instrumental objections to compulsory voting exist, I agree that
compulsory voting is a nonstarter because of a libertarian belief
prevalent in the United States against government interference in
the decision to vote.
Perhaps the strongest instrumental argument against compulsory
voting is that it would lead to poorer decisionmaking by the
electorate. Although the law would mandate casting a ballot, it
would not mandate becoming an informed voter before doing
so. 15 There certainly is some merit to this argument. Kirchner's
study of Australia's compulsory voting law suggests that a compul-
sory voting law does not necessarily encourage voters to educate
themselves about politics. 158  Moreover, Bennett and Resnick
found that although American nonvoters had opinions similar to
'54 Virginia only rarely levied fines against nonvoters, amounting to one-quarter
of the voter's annual tax. SeeJ.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND
THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 293 (1966). Georgia's 1777 Constitution
imposed a fine of not more than £5 on nonvoters, "but there is no evidence that this
provision was ever enforced." A HISTORY OF GEORGIA 75 (Kenneth Coleman ed., 2d
ed. 1991). Abraham describes other attempts in the United States to enact
compulsory voting laws. See HenryJ. Abraham, What Curefor VoterApathy, 39 NAT'L
MUN. REv. 346, 346-47 (1952).
155 Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision ofAmerican State Constitutions:
Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473,
1503 (1987); see also AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 118, at 4 ("I can imagine the
reactions of Texans if they were told they had to vote or it was a misdemeanor not
to do so." (quoting Professor Norman R. Luttbeg, Texas A & M University)). Most
analyses of proposals to increase American voter turnout do not even consider a
compulsory voting law as a viable proposal. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/PEMD-91-1, VOTING: SOME PROCEDURAL CHANGES AND INFORMATIONAL
ACTIVITIES COULD INCREASE TURNOUT 21-22 (1991) (noting that penalties for not
voting would have a major impact on turnout but failing to discuss such penalties
among proposals for increasing American voter turnout); Powell, supra note 134, at
35 (assuming that the United States would not wish to introduce compulsory voting).
" TEIXEIRA, supra note 78, at 154.
157 See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 118, at app. A-3 (report of Professor
Norman R. Luttbeg, Texas A & M University) ("[O]ne cannot be certain about the
qualities of the potential non-voter brought to the polls solely by fear of receiving a
non-voting citation and fine.").
" See Kirchner,supra note 136, at 10-11 (citinga number ofstatistics demonstrat-
ing the ignorance of Australians about their political system).
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voters on issues ranging from egalitarianism to civil liberties to
government spending, nonvoters tend to be more ill-informed than
voters about public affairs.
159
This problem of ignorance could be ameliorated by a compul-
sory voting law that allows ignorant voters to abstain once at the
polls. More importantly, the risk of poor decisionmaking is an
unavoidable side effect of equalizing political capital among
individuals. Mervyn Field's research reveals that only a small
percentage of nonvoters are content with the political system.'
60
Without compulsory voting, an important segment of the American
population remains without an effective voice. "People 'without
voice' are not represented. They are more akin to 'subjects' than to
the 'citizens' who English and American proponents of popular
sovereignty 'invented' in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
"161
Another instrumental argument against a compulsory voting law
is that enforcement would be costly and ineffective. The analysis
above, however, suggests that the law need not be well-enforced to
be effective; 1 2 the very enactment of the law, with its attendant
publicity and perhaps an initial effort at enforcement aimed at those
making instrumental calculations, should do much to stimulate voting.'6
"' See Bennett & Resnick, supra note 72, at 786-88,799. For a further comparison
of the policy preferences of voters and nonvoters, see TEIXEIRA, supra note 78, at 97-
101.
160 See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 118, at 93-94.
161 Bennett & Resnick, supra note 72, at 799; see also TEIXEIRA, supra note 78, at
105 ("[L]ow and declining voter turnout weakens the democratic link between elites
and citizens, particularly in terms of democratic legitimacy and agenda setting.");
Crewe, supra note 130, at 262 ("[I]t is those who most need the vote who tend to use
it least, and universal suffrage fails to provide the political counterweight to the
power of property and wealth in the way that was intended by its more radical
proponents.").
Nino has justified compulsory voting in Argentina "as legitimate paternalism,
given the coordination problems that arise when many individuals belonging to
specific sectors of society think that their particular vote is not essential for their
group's interest to be taken into account." Carlos S. Nino, Transition to Democracy,
Corporatism and Constitutional Reform in Latin America, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129, 143
(1989); see also id. (calling for compulsory voting "in order to strengthen the
democratic power of common citizens against that of corporations").
'
62 See supra notes 130-44 and accompanying text.
iTwo other impediments to a compulsory voting law deserve mention. First, a
compulsory voting proposal with a requirement for some sort of national identity
card could get embroiled in immigration and other politics, as have proposals for
same-day vote registration. See Wolfinger et al., supra note 4, at 567-68. On the
other hand, compulsory voting without the card requirement likely would result in
claims that compulsory voting would lead to voter fraud-as suggested by the
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These instrumental arguments, though, dance around the real
issue of libertarianism. Although the government tells people what
to do all the time-file an income tax return, serve on ajury, register
in the Selective Service Program, separate trash -- hackles rise
when compulsory voting is mentioned. I have no good explanation
for this phenomenon, especially in a compulsory voting system
allowing for abstention."
It is doubtful that opposition to a compulsory voting law stems
from a concern over time spent going to the polling booth-voting
in federal elections occurs one day every two years, and with the
arguments against the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. See, e.g., 139 CONG.
REC. S5739-01 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Sen. Helms) ("This Bill should
be called the Illegal Aliens' Voter Registration Act.").
Second, one might raise First Amendment objections: Forcing someone to vote
arguably is tantamount to requiring speech. This point has considerably less force
given the abstention option-the only conduct that is forced is showing up to the polls
and abstaining in each race. In any case, the Supreme Court has rejected any
argument that the vote itself may be expressive speech. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428,438 (1992) (rejecting a voter's claim that Hawaii's ban on write-in candidates
deprives him of the right to cast "a 'protest vote' for Donald Duck"). "[T]he function
of the election process is 'to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen
candidates,' not to provide a means of giving vent to 'short-range political goals,
pique, or personal quarrels.' Attributing to elections a more generalized expressive
function would undermine the ability of States to operate elections fairly and
efficiently." Id. (citations omitted); see also Hoffman v. Maryland, 928 F.2d 646, 648-
49 (4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the argument that Maryland's voter-purge statute
deprives voters of the right to express dissatisfaction through not voting, on grounds
that the statute is content neutral and does not block "other means of communicating
the same dissatisfaction with the candidates"). But see Kansas City v. Whipple, 38
S.W. 295,297 (Mo. 1896) (striking down, without mentioning particular constitutional
violations, a Kansas City penalty tax imposed for failure to vote on grounds that "it
is obnoxious to the provisions of the organic law which secures to every citizen
protection against partial and discriminative taxation, and against invasion of his
sovereign right ofsuffrage");Jeffrey A. Blomberg, Protecting the Right Not to Vote from
Voter Purge Statutes, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1015 (1995) (arguing that courts should
recognize a fundamental right not to vote and therefore strike down voter purge
statues); Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330 (1993)
(arguing that voting should be seen as an expressive activity).
In addition to the impediments, some commentators have argued that
compulsory voting in the United States might affect the ideological content of party
politics. See, e.g., KEvIN P. PHILLIPS & PAUL H. BLACKMAN, ELECTORAL REFORM AND
VOTER PARTICIPATION 69 (1975). Depending upon one's views of good politics,
stronger ideological parties could be a positive development.
"I See Ross Parish, For Compulsoty Voting, POLICY, Autumn 1992, at 15, 17
(analogizing compulsory voting to jury duty and military conscription).
"6 Cf. Kirchner, supra note 136, at 9 ("[Australia's compulsory voting law] prevents
the expression of dissatisfaction with the political system, political parties and
individual candidates by denying electors the option of 'staying at home' on polling
day.").
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possibility of absentee balloting, one could choose the time to vote
well in advance. Nor can the opposition be traced to the fact that
repressive regimes also have employed compulsory voting--usually
for a single candidate or party. This is no better a reason to oppose
compulsory voting than it is a reason to oppose the trains running
on time in a democracy.
I can sketch two possible explanations for the libertarian
opposition. The first is historical. Voluntary voting has been in
place too long in the United States for it to be questioned now.
Voting in this country is seen as a civic duty, and a call for compul-
sory voting may be viewed as a failure of the democratic experi-
ment. Americans find it somehow perverse to require people to
affirm their faith in the democratic system. Compare the situation
in Australia, which has had compulsory voting for most of this
century. Approximately seventy percent of the Australian public
favors compulsory voting." Arguably we can explain current
attitudes about compulsory voting as a product of each state's past
history with such a law.
167
The other explanation for opposition to compulsory voting in
the United States may be found in the "political culture" of
American society. According to this cultural explanation, the
"individualism" of American society best explains the opposition to
the law." This explanation is hard to square, however, with the
Australian case, a society no less renowned for its commitment to
rugged individualism 69 but apparently committed to compulsory
voting as well.
Locating American opposition to a compulsory voting law in the
national psyche has a certain intuitive appeal, but it is a troubling
explanation for social scientists. Cultural explanations of political
166 See AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMM'N, RES. REP. No. 1, SOURCES OF ELECTORAL
INFORMATION 17 (1989); Kirchner, supra note 136, at 1. Australian attitudes about
compulsory voting did not vary significantly with gender, voting intention, education,
income, or occupation status. See AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMM'N, supra, at 17.
Curiously, about 72% ofAustralians agree with the proposition that most people vote
only because the law requires them to do so. See id. at 18. Perhaps respondents
would have answered this question differently if they were asked whether tey
thenselves would vote in the absence of a compulsory voting law.
167 This argument is bolstered by opposition to Australia's compulsory voting law,
which declines steadily with age. See AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMM'N, supra note
166, at 17.
'"See Colantuono, supra note 155, at 1503.
'"For Hollywood's characterization, see "CROCODILE" DUNDEE (Paramount
Pictures Corp. 1989).
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behavior went out of vogue in political science at about the same
time as functionalist sociological theory, 170 and such explanations
similarly are beginning to reemerge in a "new and improved"
form." We need to know much more about how culture arises
and shapes preferences before we can advance cultural arguments
about why Americans but not Australians are vehemently opposed
to a compulsory voting law.
CONCLUSION
A theory of social norms provides a richer account of social
interaction than pure rational choice theories. Freed from
functionalism, social norms theory promises to advance "post-
Chicago" law and economics to new heights.Y7 As the emerging
theory grapples to explain the origin, stability, and decline of social
norms, we should not lose sight of the need to generate testable
propositions that can disprove norm-based hypotheses. I have
attempted to show here that there is good evidence suggesting the
existence of a norm of voting that overcomes the rational choice
paradox of voting. Although additional evidence may bolster the
case for norms, it is difficult to imagine a rock-solid case given the
murky nature of norms.
Social norms theory also provides important information for
making normative judgments. Voting without law for many people
means simply not voting. The paradox of voting set forth by
rational choice theory demonstrates why individuals may not vote
even if it is in the collective interest of the individual's group or
society as a whole to do so. And the theory of social norms indicates
that an equal distribution of a voting norm among groups in society
is hardly inevitable. Rather, the unequal conditions for the
emergence of a norm of voting have led (along with a host of other
factors) to unequal distribution of political power. In addition, a
decline in the American voting norm at some point may threaten
the legitimacy of our democratic government.
Depending upon one's view of good politics, a compulsory
voting law may be justifiable as a preference-shaping mechanism.
I" The classic work on political culture is GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA,
THE Civic CuLTURE (1963). For a critique, see BARRY, supra note 18, at 48-52.
171 See David D. Laitin, The Civic Culture at 30, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 168 (1995)
(reviewing recent work in political culture theory).
" See Symposium, "Post-Chicago" Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1
(1989).
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Nonetheless, for reasons that may be historical or cultural, and
certainly for reasons that are poorly understood, adoption of
compulsory voting in the United States is about as likely as being
corralled by a red-dyed rope.

